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SPECIAL ISSUE OF PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

This issue of *Problems of Communism* is devoted almost exclusively to communism's aims, strategy and tactics in certain nonindustrialized areas of the world. The articles that follow trace, as case studies, the histories of some indigenous Communist parties, outlining their successes and failures, and analyzing the nature of the appeal communism currently is making to peoples in underdeveloped areas.

Current Communist Strategy in Nonindustrialized Countries

By Bernard S. Morris and Morris Watnick

AS a program for the organization of society, communism confronts the world with a twofold challenge. In advanced "capitalist" countries, it offers the vision of a planned social order based on an industrialization already achieved; to the underdeveloped areas, it promises an accelerated industrialization-to-come, telescoping the protracted period of development through which the advanced Western countries reached their present height of wealth and power under capitalism.

By and large, the Communist appeal in the advanced countries has reached its limit; here the predictions of sharpening class conflict, impoverishment of the masses, and widening discrepancies in wealth have been belied by the trend toward the welfare state, achieved within a framework of political democracy. Forecasts of industrial crisis and mass unemployment have fared no better. In this respect, communism ironically has turned out to be something of a self-negating prophecy; as long as it stands as a political and military threat to the West it perpetuates a defense economy and full employment. There is every reason to suppose, however, that democratic institutions can be used to stabilize employment at a high level in a full-time peace economy.

By contrast, the Communist appeal in underdeveloped areas is still formidable. In particular, it holds an attraction for those groups of the population who prefer drastic industrialization "from above" to the gradualist, evolutionary tradition of the West—notably for the various layers of intellectuals who cannot find accomodation in a slower process of change. For these groups, it is the USSR and China, not the Western industrial countries, which—to borrow a phrase from Marx—present to other underdeveloped areas an image of their own future.[1]

That the industrialization of the USSR was accomplished at a much greater social and human cost than in the West is a point frequently minimized by those in other areas who put more store by the West's technology than by its humanistic tradition. Moreover, the basic social and political conditions in the underdeveloped areas of today are such that comparisons with Western development are not very pertinent. (In this respect, the use of such terms as "democracy" and "nationalism" to describe what is happening can be misleading, for they imply a degree of mass participation and response which simply does not exist at this stage.) Finally, the international political situation is one that forces a development in these areas totally different from that experienced by the West over the last 300 years. The very existence of

Mr. Morris is a political analyst specializing in international communism. Mr. Watnick has done extensive studies on the problems of underdeveloped areas. For a more detailed analysis of their subject, the authors recommend the following works by John Kautsky: "The New Strategy of International Communism," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLIX, No. 2, June 1955, pp. 478–486; "Indian Communist Party Strategy Since 1947," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, June 1955, pp. 145–160 and Mr. Kautsky's forthcoming book, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India: A Study in the Postwar Evolution of Communist Strategy* (to be published by John Wiley & Sons, New York).

[1] See Eduard Heimann, "Marxism and Underdeveloped Countries," *Social Research*, September 1952, pp. 322–345; and G. F. Achminov, *Die Macht im Hintergrund* (The Unseen Force), Grenchen/Ulm, Spatenverlag, 1950, Chapters 3–9.

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two opposing power centers, the US and the USSR each bidding for the support of the underdeveloped countries, tends to increase the pressure on them for centrally planned and very rapid social change.

Whether these countries can hold their own under such circumstances without succumbing to the totalitarian impulse of communism is, of course, one of the major questions of our day. Real as are the tendencies which favor communism in some of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, there is no grim finality about them. We are not confronted by a "wave of the future," nor do the Communists assume it in their activities; they recognize in their doctrine the simple political truism that power is not the automatic result of the working of "social forces," that it must be won before it can be exercised. It is the purpose of the following survey to outline, in more or less schematic terms, the type of political strategy Communists are following today to eradicate Western influence from underdeveloped areas and to win a mass following for an eventual seizure of power.

How much Communist strategy owes to classical Marxism as distinct from power politics has been the subject of extensive discussion and study, and is too complex a question to be considered in a brief paper. Undeniably, certain elements of Marxian doctrine exercised some influence on Communist strategy in the early period of Bolshevik expansion, perhaps as much because of their emotive symbolism as for their analytical substance. But Marxism as a doctrine soon found a strong competitor in the power interests of the USSR and, with the passage of time, it became increasingly difficult to disentangle the respective influence each had in determining the strategy of Communist parties all over the world. Fortunately, however, it is possible to analyze a Communist strategy in simple operational terms without settling the theoretical question of its derivation.

Like any other group aspiring to power, Communists must try to identify their probable friends and foes in the population at large and work out a relation to each which will maximize their mass following, maneuverability and the like. In trying to do this, Communists—particularly in underdeveloped areas—have run afoul of two problems peculiar to their own movements: how to reconcile their own political needs with the power interests of the Soviet Union and how to translate their own version of Marxism into specific political policies. The root of these problems and the key to Communist political strategy is the type of "alliance" the Communists choose to make with various "classes" in a given situation.

The Basic Chinese Communist Pattern

COMMUNIST strategy in underdeveloped areas today may be described as Chinese in origin, Russian by adoption, and with the possible exception of parts of Africa, worldwide in application. Its basic ingredients are borrowed from Mao Tse-tung's strategy as it evolved after 1940 in response to conditions in China. Despite vast differences in the historical development, cultural traditions and social structure of the countries of Asia and Latin America, this strategy governs the policies of all the local Communist movements; it is based on a standardized reading of the problems of these areas and is applied with startling uniformity though, of course, with tactical diversity.

In summary terms, its underlying purpose is to weld into a political bloc under the direction of the Communist Party a following of urban workers, peasants, the "petty bourgeoisie" and those sections of the "national bourgeoisie" whose business interests bring them into conflict either with the national government or with foreign influence, or both, as the case may be. What distinguishes it from past strategies followed under Comintern direction is the attempt to widen communism's appeal; the type of bloc which is to be led by a Communist Party is virtually all-inclusive, even to the extent of counting within its ranks the "national bourgeoisie," which was formerly rejected for the most part as a domestic agent of foreign imperialism. Moreover, in attempting to form such a bloc, Communists appeal to *classes as classes*, not to different political parties which in the traditional Marxian reading are supposed to represent class interests. The present Communist strategy thus goes far beyond anything generally ventured in the "united front" period of the thirties. It is not so much an attempt to conclude working arrangements with the leadership of other parties (the so-called "united front from above") or even to win away merely the worker following of Socialist parties, as it is an appeal to the aspirations of all classes.

It is the penultimate form of a strategy which Communists, even of the less doctrinaire stripe, formerly denounced as "class collaboration." [2] By

[2] For all his denunciation of sectarianism in Communist strategy, Lenin never envisioned such a watering-down of the Communist appeal. In his remarks before the second Congress of the Comintern, dealing specifically with Communist strategy in underdeveloped areas, he made it unmistakably clear that while Communists in the "colonies and semicolonies" might collaborate with organized "bourgeois-democratic" parties, they should always preserve "the independence of the proletarian movement even in its most embryonic form." (See Lenin's *Selected Works*, International Publishers, New York, Vol. X, pp. 239–44.)

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an extension of Communist terminology of the 1930's, the strategy might be described as a *national popular front "from below"*. Yet while its obvious purpose is to enable the Communists ultimately to displace the leadership of all other parties, the strategy does not preclude "*united front from above*" arrangements with more powerful parties where expedient.

In line with the Communists' bid for a broad national base, the present strategy is neutral with regard to the employment of armed force—a widespread notion to the contrary notwithstanding. In fact, the employment of armed force has always been a tactical matter in Communist policies, never basic. The present strategy is no exception to the rule. A Communist-led bloc can employ military force (the Chinese Communist and Vietminh revolutions, for example) or dispense with it (the Communists of India after 1950), depending on the prevailing tactical situation. At present the Soviet diplomacy of "accommodation" places a premium on nonviolent action as the most likely to eliminate or neutralize American influence in these areas.

The broad outlines of this strategy first appeared in Mao Tse-tung's writings of the late "united front" period, notably in "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" (1939) and in "On New Democracy" (1940).[3] The all-inclusive national appeal outlined in these tracts is abundantly in evidence. What Mao proposed was a multiclass alliance of workers, peasants, the "petty bourgeoisie" and "national bourgeoisie," directed by the Communist Party to the overthrow of "foreign imperialist rule in China and domestic feudalism." The "national bourgeoisie"—formerly accepted skittishly, if at all, only as a temporary ally in Comintern strategy—was now granted a place within the political bloc; the Communists were to hold the real levers of power but were to postpone the Communist aspects of their own program in favor of an initial period of "bourgeois democratic revolution," following seizure of the government.

This new Maoist strategy emerged from and ran parallel to the peasant-based armed struggle with which Chinese communism is usually identified. When the strategy was generalized for all other underdeveloped areas, however, it was divested of its peculiar Chinese form and could be applied with or without "armed struggle" as circumstances required.

It is easy enough to dismiss Mao's "bloc" thesis as an attempt to beguile China and the world into a grand misreading of what the Chinese Communists intended to do, once they came to power. Five years of Communist rule in China has given ample evidence that the role assigned in Mao's works to the bourgeoisie—and for that matter to every other class in the bloc—is pure fiction if taken at face value. The Communist regime in China is a government by a party elite which manipulates *all* classes to achieve its own goals. Yet these early statements contain a grain of truth which bulks large in the wider application of the strategy in other underdeveloped areas. In the 5 years during which the Communists have governed China, its business classes have been effectively pulverized as classes and deprived of any real control over their properties. But, in contrast to the pattern of obliteration followed by the Communists when they seized power in Russia, the Chinese Communists have managed to transform the role of certain sections of the Chinese business community, absorbing them by degrees into the managerial bureaucracy. In Asia, where business groups frequently owe their existence to governmental policies, and are intimately dependent upon the state apparatus, the bureaucratization of a portion of the Chinese "national bourgeoisie" may be regarded with far less concern than is generally imagined. What use Communist propaganda elsewhere in Asia makes of the Chinese experience is illustrated in the following passage from a propaganda tract published in India:

Supposing, therefore, communism of the Chinese type comes to India: the majority of our capitalists and particularly the industrialists would not only survive but receive every possible encouragement from the Government in the interest of production. In fact, the national bourgeoisie, or patriotic capitalists who have not tied themselves with Anglo-American cartels, would have every reason to welcome such a changeover. The ax of the new regime would fall only upon half a dozen of the bigger cartel kings of India—the compradors with powerful foreign alliances, the zemindars, the black-marketeers, speculators and moneylenders. These would probably be sent to reformatories. The rest of our bourgeoisie would be allowed to coexist, cooperate, and coprosper together with the people.[4]

Generalization of the Chinese Communist Strategy

THE substance of the four-class bloc strategy was incorporated in the programs of a number of Communist parties—notably those of Japan, Indochina, and Brazil—in the early postwar period. But

[3] *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 3, Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd., London 1954, pp. 72–101 and 106–56, respectively. The text of "On New Democracy," also has been printed by the US 81st Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 154, Pt. 3, "Communism in China," Washington, 1949, Appendix B, pp. 67–91.

[4] R. K. Karanjia, *China Stands Up*, Bombay, 1952, p. 160.

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not until the victory of the Chinese Communist Party was it prescribed as mandatory for most parties in underdeveloped areas. The official endorsement came at a trade union conference of Asian and Australasian countries, held under the auspices of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peiping, November 16–December 1, 1949. Liu Shao-chi, the acknowledged ideologue of the Chinese Communist Party, sounded the keynote in his opening speech at the conference:

The course followed by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the People's Republic of China is the course that should be followed by the peoples of the various colonial and semicolonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy.

The steps which led the Chinese people to victory may be demonstrated by the following formula:

1. The working class must unite with all the other classes, political parties and groups, organizations and individuals, who are willing to oppose the oppression of imperialism and its lackeys, in order to form a broad and nationwide united front and wage a resolute fight against imperialism and its stooges.

2. This nationwide united front must be led by the working class and its party, the Communist Party, which oppose imperialism most resolutely, most courageously and most unselfishly, and must be built around the working class and the Communist Party as its center. It must not be led by the wavering and compromising national bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie and their parties.

3. In order to enable the working class and its party, the Communist Party, to become the center for uniting all the forces throughout the nation against imperialism, and competently to lead the national united front to victory, it is necessary to build up through long struggles a Communist Party, which is armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, understands strategy and tactics, practices self-criticism and strict discipline and is closely linked with the masses.

4. It is necessary to set up *wherever and whenever possible* a national liberation army led by the Communist Party, powerful and skillful in fighting the enemy, as well as the bases on which it relies for its activities, and to coordinate the mass struggles in the enemy-controlled areas and the armed struggles. Armed struggle is the main form of the fight for national liberation in many colonies and semicolonies.

This is the basic way followed and practiced in China by the Chinese people in winning their victory. This way is the way of Mao Tse-tung, and it may also be the basic way for winning emancipation by the people of other colonial and semicolonial countries *where similar conditions prevail.*

At the close of its sessions the conference resolved:

In the colonial and semicolonial countries of Asia, *to take into account local conditions and national characteristics and use the appropriate methods* to achieve people's unity in the fight for genuine national independence, for democracy and peace, and against the imperialists and their agents.

For the correct assessment of these methods, valuable lessons may be drawn from the experience of the Chinese people, who under the leadership of their working class, have created a united national front, and who, with the support of all strata of the population, in the first place with the support of the peasantry, have waged a great struggle for national liberation, finally routing the combined forces of domestic reaction and international imperialism. [Italics added.] [5]

It is clear, then, that the Communist parties of Asia were called upon to adopt the Chinese model of the multiclass bloc and to couple it with armed action only where and when feasible. That suitable conditions for successful military action were not to be taken for granted in all cases has been made clear in numerous Communist pronouncements. A statement by Ye. M. Zhukov, a leading Soviet commentator on Communist movements in "colonies" and "semicolonies," is typical:

. . . It would be risky to regard the Chinese revolution as some kind of "stereotype" for people's democratic revolution in other countries of Asia.
In particular, it is difficult to presuppose that other countries of the Orient following the path of a people's democracy could necessarily calculate on acquiring the vitally important advantage of the Chinese revolution—a revolutionary army such as there is in China.[6]

If there were any doubt about the endorsement of Chinese Communist strategy—not as a prescription for "armed struggle" but in its political dimension as a model for the Communist parties of other areas in Asia—it ought to be dispelled by the following statement of R. Palme Dutt, a leading British Communist of Indian descent, who has often served as spokesman for the international Communist movement on "colonial" matters:

The Chinese people's revolution and the achievements of the Chinese People's Republic, won under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, have shown the way to build the united national front of the working class, the peasantry, the intellectuals and urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie, for the victory of the democratic, anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution, and for the establishment of the new type of state of people's democracy. . . . [7]

The Four-Class Bloc Appeal

TODAY the strategy of the four-class bloc is *de rigueur* for all Communist parties in underdeveloped areas.

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[5] *World Trade Union Movement*, published by WFTU, Paris, No. 8, December 1949, pp. 14 and 40, respectively.

[6] *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, New York, June 28, 1952, p. 3.

[7] "New Features in National Liberation Struggle of Colonial and Dependent Peoples," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, Bucharest, October 8, 1954, p. 6.

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It was explicitly invoked in January 1950 when Moscow intervened in Indian Communist Party affairs to force out the "left" leadership of B. T. Ranadive and bring the party into line with the Maoist strategy. Omitting India from the list of countries where armed struggle was sanctioned, the Moscow-inspired statement in the Cominform journal of January 27, 1950, stated:

In these conditions the task of the Indian Communists, drawing on the experience of the national-liberation movement in China and other countries, is, naturally, to strengthen the alliance of the working class with all the peasantry, to fight for the introduction of the urgently needed agrarian reform and—on the basis of the common struggle for freedom and national independence of their country against the Anglo-American imperialists oppressing it, and against the reactionary big bourgeoisie and feudal princes collaborating with them—to unite all classes, parties, groups, and organizations willing to defend the national independence and freedom of India.

How far the Indian and other Communist parties are prepared to go in catering to different classes is illustrated in party programs adopted after 1950. The Communist Party of India, suddenly turning "protectionist," declared: "The working class must come out for the protection of national industries against the competition of the imperialists." [8] The draft program of the Indonesian Communist Party, adopted in March 1954, provided for seizure without compensation of all foreign and native-owned large estates but stipulated that the land and other properties of "rich peasants" would not be seized and that the land and other properties of middle peasants would be protected by the government. Similarly, the Indonesian Communist-dominated trade union federation (SOBSI) at its 1952 conference went so far as to delete from its constitution all reference to the terms "socialism" and "people's democracy" to allay any suspicion of its program.[9]

To take another case, the Israeli Communist Party, describing Israel as a "semicolonial" country because of its dependence on American and foreign capital, set itself the task of replacing the present government with a coalition representing all anti-imperialist forces including the "working class, the working *fellahin* [peasants], professional people, educated workers, middle groups and part of the industrial bourgeoisie." Although the program defines the party's aim as the establishment of a socialist regime, it rejects this goal in the present period. The problem at the present stage is envisioned, not as one of putting an end to capitalism in Israel and setting up a "socialist" regime, but as one of eliminating the hold of foreign capital on the Israeli economy.[10]

The strategy also has been taken over in the programs of Communist parties in Latin America, of which the Brazilian may serve as an example. Luiz Carlos Prestes, general secretary of the Communist Party of Brazil, stated in a recent report to the party central committee:

This position of Brazil as a semicolonial and semifeudal country is becoming even more pronounced as a result of the growing domination of the North American imperialists. . . . The US imperialists and the feudal remnants are the chief enemies of progress and of the life and security of the overwhelming majority of the population.
Thus the Brazilian revolution at the present stage can be characterized as a people's democratic revolution, an anti-imperialist, antifeudal and agrarian revolution.[11]

Calling for the "broadest possible Democratic Front of National Liberation" under the control of the Communist Party, Prestes not only made a place in the bloc for the "national bourgeoisie" but also set up the Communist Party as the defender of its interest:

The party program not only does not threaten the interests of the national bourgeoisie, but upholds those of its demands which are progressive in character, in particular, the demand for developing the national industry.
It would be a mistake—one which could weaken the anti-imperialist, antifeudal forces—to confuse the national bourgeoisie with the forces of the feudal and imperialist camp and to underrate the significance of this bourgeoisie, particularly in the present stage of the revolutionary movement in Brazil, owing to its influence on the petty bourgeoisie, the peasant masses and even on part of the workers.[12]

It should be noted parenthetically that these Communist programs are not promulgated as statements of strategy in the strict sense of the term. What they purport to do is to analyze the contemporary political

[8] Third Congress of the Communist Party of India, Madurai, December 27, 1953 to January 4, 1954, *Political Resolution*, Communist Party of India, New Delhi, February 1954, pp. 28–29.

[9] The Indonesian Communist Party has not gone as far as SOBSI, but in its recent election manifesto the party stated that its program for a national coalition government would not be that of a "people's democracy." (Peiping NCNA broadcast to Southeast Asia, June 28, 1955.)

[10] Program of the Israeli Communist Party adopted by its Twelfth Congress held in Tel Aviv, June 1, 1952. For a summary, see *Ost-Probleme*, Bonn, Jahrg. 4, #28, July 12, 1952, pp. 890–891.

[11] *For a Lasting Peace*, January 21, 1955, p. 5.

[12] *For a Lasting Peace*, January 21, 1955, p. 5. The Brazilian Communist Party draft program is reprinted in *For a Lasting Peace*, February 26, 1954, pp. 3–4. See also statement of Diogenes Arruda, secretary of the Central Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party, in *Imprensa Popular* (Rio de Janeiro) December 5, 1954, and a shortened version in *For a Lasting Peace*, February 25, 1955, p. 3. See also the statements by the Argentine Communist Party and the People's Socialist Party (Communist) of Cuba in *For a Lasting Peace*, January 15, 1954, p. 5, and June 18, 1954, p. 5, respectively.

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scene in terms of Marxist class schema and from such an analysis to derive the political and economic policies the Communists would put into effect were they to achieve power. Obviously, however, the programs are and are intended to be crucial strategic weapons in the sense that they attempt to influence mass behavior by exploiting prevailing popular discontent and the hope for a better future.

The Present Tactical Situation

IT seems clear from the above that the Communist parties in the underdeveloped areas share a uniform strategy sanctioned alike by Moscow and Peiping. In it, the United States has become the main target of attack, and any demand for a Communist revolution, properly so-called, has been subordinated to a program more palatable to influential groups of the populations.

How is this to be achieved? On the positive side, Communist programs have been redrawn as indicated, in an attempt to make them more acceptable to propertied groups. On the other hand, since the use of armed force would alienate precisely those groups which the Communists are trying to attract, there has been a tendency to abandon military action or violence except when a Communist-sponsored political coalition feels it is strong enough to be certain of victory.[13]

[13] The only exception has been the Japanese Communist Party, which at the behest of Moscow and Peiping jeopardized its political future by incorporating (in 1950–51) an element of illegal "direct action" into its strategy. The party has since discarded illegal action in an attempt to recoup some of its political losses.

Soviet strategy and diplomacy also have been such as to deflect Communist action, in most cases, from violence to political warfare and propaganda. In his last full-dress discussion of the subject, Stalin took the view that war is more likely to occur between "capitalist" states than between the capitalist world and the Soviet bloc. He drew the strategic inference from this assumption that the first task of Communist parties throughout the world was to isolate the United States and thereby to improve the relative power position of the Communist bloc.[14] In support of this position, the USSR has set in motion a worldwide peace campaign geared not to revolution, but to weakening American defense arrangements by creating distrust of US policies, encouraging neutralism and winning new allies.

Under these circumstances, it makes sense for Communists in Asia to terminate their rebellions and to emphasize political activity of a legal type, designed to promote "unity of action" and "peace." By capitalizing on the anti-Western animus of many of the peoples of the underdeveloped areas, as well as on their desire for peace and for neutrality, and by holding out the promise of rapid social improvement to all groups in a "people's democracy," the present Communist strategy may, in the long run, prove to be a far greater obstacle to orderly economic progress and the evolution of stable political institutions than the abortive recourse to armed struggle in the late 1940's.

[14] *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Supplement to *New Times*, No. 44, October 29, 1952, pp. 14–16.

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Conflicts Within the Indian CP

By Randolph Carr

THE history of the Communist Party of India (CPI) reveals tremendous confusion and conflict concerning the basic concepts of international Communist strategy and tactics. Only recently has the gradually increasing pressure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) managed to impose a somewhat more stable course of action on the CPI and assured that its efforts will be adjusted to the interests of the world Communist movement.

During World War II, when Germany was bearing down on the USSR, the CPSU directed Communist parties throughout the world to set aside temporarily the attack against British imperialism and American capitalism and prepare to face the immediate threat posed by fascism. The CPI was directed to support the war effort of their British rulers. For the Indian Communists this meant dropping out of the Indian nationalist movement at a crucial time, a step many Communists were unwilling to take. In July 1941, a full month after the German invasion of the USSR, the Politburo of the CPI declared:

The only way in which the Indian people can help in the just war which the Soviet is waging is by fighting all the more vigorously to win emancipation from the imperialist yoke. Our attitude towards the British Government and its imperialist war remains what it was. We must continue, nay, intensify our struggles against the British.[1]

About six months later, the British Communist Party, often the channel through which the CPSU guides the Indian Party, sent a letter to the CPI ordering it to drop its anti-British and antiwar attitude and switch to the new line. CPI resistance to the new policy persisted, however, until the end of 1942, when the Politburo of the CPI finally called for support of the British war effort and condemned its own past "bourgeois nationalist deviation."[2]

When it became clear in 1947 that the British were withdrawing from India, Moscow decided to adopt a friendly attitude toward Nehru's new national government, and Indian Communists received instructions to support Nehru's government. The "word" was passed by R. Palme Dutt, a top theoretician and leading figure in the Communist Party of Great Britain, who visited India in February 1947 and wrote shortly after two articles for *Peoples Age*, the official organ of the CPI. Dutt called upon Indian Communists to cooperate with "progressive" elements in the Indian National Congress Party, and he also urged Nehru to act jointly with the USSR in the United Nations. While some Indian Communist leaders remained opposed to this course, the CPI offered its support to the Nehru government on this basis. The party came out, for example, in favor of the Congress Party's comparatively mild peasant program of reduced rents, improved tenancy rights and easier credit facilities. A resolution passed by the Central Committee of the CPI in June 1947 spoke of the need for "bringing new strength to the popular government for the realization of complete independence," declared the CPI would support it completely and urged the national leadership to join "the world democratic camp led by the Soviet Union.[3]

In mid-1947, however, a policy split among Soviet experts on India seemed to weaken direct Soviet control of the CPI. V. V. Balabushevich and A. N. Dyakov identified the entire Indian bourgeoisie as allied with imperialism and, by implication, recommended that the CPI cease supporting the Indian government.[4] On the other hand, E. M. Zhukov,

[1] *Soviet-German War*, Politburo of the Communist Party of India, July 1941, quoted in M. R. Masani, *The Communist Party of India*, Macmillan, N. Y., 1954, p. 277.

[2] *Masani, op. cit.*; p. 80.

[3] *People's Age*, Bombay, June 29, 1947.

[4] *Uchenye zapiski tikhookeanskovo instituta* (Scientific Notes of the Pacific Institute), Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1947, Vol. II.

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head of the Pacific Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, condemned only the "big" Indian bourgeoisie, implicitly recommending continued cooperation with "progressive" elements in the middle class and in the Indian National Congress Party.[5] An article by Andrei Zhdanov (at the time one of the most influential leaders in the CPSU) in the November 10, 1947, issue of the Cominform journal, *For a Lasting Peace*, did nothing to resolve the contradiction between these views. Zhdanov clearly defined his thesis of the division of the world into two camps, but nowhere did he suggest the strategy Communist parties should take in the new situation. Thus Zhukov in a second article supported his position by quoting Zhdanov, while Balabushevich and Dyakov continued to recommend a policy of opposition to the Indian Government.[6]

The Central Committee of the CPI, meeting on December 7–16, 1947, selected the more extreme policy. Overriding the protests of its general secretary, P. C. Joshi, the Committee adopted a resolution condemning the whole Congress Party and government, including Nehru and his "progressive camp."[7] This was a clear victory for the extremist faction led by B. T. Ranadive.

Ranadive Proposes Revolt

RANADIVE believed firmly that conditions in India were ripe for a revolution similar to the October 1917 revolution in Russia, and he proposed that the CPI lead such a revolt in India. The CPI, he said, must forge a "democratic front" of all militant groups and *true* revolutionaries and initiate the final armed struggle to establish the hegemony of the working class and to attain true national independence.[8] The Second Congress of the CPI, meeting in March 1948, approved Ranadive's views and attacked the Congress Party government as "collaborationist bourgeoisie cooperating with Anglo-American imperialism." India, the Communists charged, was not yet an independent state, for Congress Party leadership veiled continued British rule.[9]

Some leaders of the Indian Communist Party, the most vociferous of whom was P. C. Joshi, the general secretary, bitterly questioned Ranadive's policy of revolutionary opposition. Joshi claimed that the country would not support a revolution and that an outright attack on all bourgeois elements in India would succeed only in isolating the party. Because of his stand, the CPI Congress removed Joshi as general secretary and replaced him with Ranadive.

Thereafter the party pursued its revolutionary line concentrating activities in urban and industrial areas: shock brigades were trained and armed, communications and public utilities were sabotaged. At the end of 1948, the party politburo formulated a general plan for a one-stage revolution leading to immediate seizure of power. The revolt was to be touched off by a general strike scheduled to begin on March 9, 1949, with an all-India railroad strike. However, because of a combination of factors—unwillingness of Socialist railroad unions to participate, Government countermeasures, and disagreement within the CPI over Ranadive's tactics—the Communist plan resulted in a complete fiasco. Not even the first action, the all-India railroad strike, materialized.[10] Ranadive's policy was discredited, and a new faction—the Andhra group, led by Rajeshwar Rao, came to the fore.

The Andhra Communists did not deny the need for revolutionary opposition; however, they held that the CPI could come to power only by relying on the peasantry as its main source of strength. Rao took as his model the Chinese Communist Party (CPC); he recommended that the CPI train the Indian peasants for guerrilla warfare, stimulate peasant revolts, seize remote areas, and set up governments in these areas from which the battle for the whole of India could be waged.[11]

An editorial addressed to the Indian Party in the Cominform journal of January 15, 1950, was used by the Andhra faction in support of its positions. The editorial stated only that the Chinese Communist path was "generally" correct for India; but the powerful Andhra faction chose to interpret this as specific support and, in the face of the weakness of the Ranadive faction, was able to assume the upper hand in the CPI. In July 1950, Ranadive was removed as general secretary and official leadership of the party passed to Rajeshwar Rao.

[5] E. Zhukov, "K polozheniiu v Indii" (The Situation in India); *Mirovoe Khoz yayistvo i Mirovaya Politika*, (World Economy and World Politics), Moscow, July 1947.

[6] Zhukov, "Obostrenie krizisa kolonialnoi sistemy" (The Growing Crisis of the Colonial System), *Bolshevik*, Moscow, December 15, 1947.

[7] Extracts from the Central Committee's Resolution, "For Full Independence and People's Democracy," appeared in *World News and Views*, London, January 17, 1948, pp. 27–9.

[8] Masani, *op. cit.*, pp. 90 ff., 281 ff.

[9] *People's Age*, Bombay, March 21, 1948.

[10] Masani, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–95, contains a good description of the party's tactics during this period.

[11] The views of both the Ranadive and Rao factions are summarized in *The Statesman*, Calcutta, Overseas Edition, July 16, 1949, p. 9. See also G. S. Bhargava, *A Study of the Communist Movement in Andhra*, New Delhi, 1955, pp. 220–225.

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Peasant partisan war, however, proved hardly more effective as a weapon than the proposed general strike and insurrection had been. By the end of 1950 the CPI was disorganized and divided. Throughout most of India the party was outlawed and harrassed by the government. The leadership was in jail or underground. Intraparty communications had broken down and the party was in great financial difficulty. Membership had declined from a peak of nearly 100,000 in 1947 to 30,000. Communist front organizations were in no better condition. The adventure in armed opposition had clearly failed.[12]

Moscow Switches Policy Line

IN the meantime, the attitude of the CPSU toward the Congress Party government had changed. Early in 1948, when Moscow realized that the national government of India was neither severing its ties with the British Commonwealth nor backing up the USSR in the United Nations, Soviet propaganda switched to the line that India had not yet obtained "complete independence" and that Nehru was a British lackey. It may well be that at this time the CPSU was not entirely displeased with the militant tactics of the CPI. By late 1950, however, the Soviet attitude had changed again. R. Palme Dutt transmitted the Soviet view in a letter to the CPI. Admittedly, he said, the Congress Party government represented big business, but this did not necessarily mean the government or the Indian bourgeoisie would support "Anglo-American imperialism." Dutt distinguished two groups in the Indian government, each espousing a different foreign policy. One favored outright alignment with the British and Americans, the other, aware that war with powerful China would mean India's doom, was inclined to be more cautious in siding with the US and UK. The government's foreign policy vacillated between these two views, Dutt said, and therefore could not be typified as being either in the interests of the Communist bloc or entirely against it. Thus, the Nehru government could no longer be labeled a simple servant of foreign imperialism. Dutt also conveyed Moscow's disapproval of the manner in which the CPI had distorted the aforementioned January 15, 1950, editorial in the Cominform journal concerning the "China way." [13]

On the basis of this criticism from Moscow, a faction in the CPI led by S. A. Dange and Ajoy Ghosh opposed the direction of the Andhra group. They accused it of trying to camouflage a left extremist line similar to the discredited policy of the 1948–49 period. Speaking with the full weight of Moscow's power behind him, Ghosh stated his conviction that the "revolutionary consciousness" of the Indian people had not yet matured sufficiently to justify a program of armed struggle. Heeding this view, the party once more embarked on a new course. Rao resigned as general secretary on June 1, 1951, and Ghosh replaced him in October.

The CPI's new position was that since India's foreign policy was in part advantageous to the Communist powers—for India had spoken against some US actions—the job of the CPI was to see that India continued to play this role. Accordingly, the party supported those aspects of the government's foreign policy which might hamper the plans of the US and facilitate those of the Communist cause. In matters of domestic policy, armed revolution was called off and the party limited itself to constitutional forms of opposition. Party members were ordered to participate in the coming general elections, the aim being to replace the government by a coalition.[14]

The changed policy of the CPI resulted in a relaxation of pressures against the party leaders. By the time of the elections at the end of 1951 and the beginning of 1952 most of the party's leaders were free to leave prison or come out of hiding. The Communists made an impressive showing in the elections, establishing themselves as the largest organized opposition in the National Parliament and in four state legislatures, winning a near majority of the state assembly seats in Travancore-Cochin, large minoritiesin Hyderabad and Madras and somewhat less in West Bengal. In the elections to the National Parliament the Communists received 4,712,000, or nearly 4.5 percent of the votes, and won 23 seats. In the elections to the state assemblies, the Communist vote was 6,100,000 or 6 percent of the total.[15]

The March 1952 meeting of the CPI Central Committee reflected the optimistic feeling that vast new possibilities had opened as a result of the party's election successes. The Central Committee directed party organizations to reorganize and stengthen themselves, to revive and broaden the base of their front organizations, and to secure the collaboration of other opposition parties in the formation of a Communist-dominated coalition to replace the Con-

[12] *Masani, op. cit.* p. 107.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 109–111.

[14] See references to the "Statement of Policy" in *Cross Roads*, Communist newspaper published in Bombay, June 8, 1951. Most of the important passages are reprinted in *Communist Conspiracy at Madurai*, published by Popular Book Depot, Bombay, 1954, pp. 35–48.

[15] *Masani, op. cit.*, pp. 157–9.

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gress Party, particularly in the Madras and Travancore-Cochin assemblies.[16]

New Strife Within CPI

ALMOST immediately, however, a deep and bitter intraparty dispute developed concerning the manner of forming these coalitions on the parliamentary, labor and other fronts. A plenary session of the Central Committee, held in January 1953, was unable to mend differences or to reach agreement of any sort and the party remained split.

Opposition to the new tactical line came primarily from the Andhra left extremists. It was only with great reluctance that they had halted their partisan war activities in Telangana and elsewhere and surrendered some of their arms. Now they challenged anew the slogan of a coalition government of democratic forces, raising the whole problem of whether the party should continue to follow the moderate line laid down in 1951. The extremists criticized the CPI leaders for underestimating the strength of the Congress Party and other "reactionary" forces. As they could point out, efforts to form coalition governments in Madras and Travancore-Cochin had been thwarted because of Congress Party opposition and because certain potential allies, such as the Socialists, had rejected the idea of coalition with the Communists. Thus, parliamentary activity achieved no positive results; on the contrary, it resulted in slackening enthusiasm and activity on the part of the party's leaders and in a loss of grassroots contact with the peasants and other sections of the population. In many areas of India, the party's hold on the people deteriorated rapidly.

As pressure for a return to armed struggle grew within the CPI, sharp conflict with the wishes of Moscow became inevitable. The CPSU informed the CPI that a revived policy of armed resistance would receive no support—the constitutional approach must continue. The growth of friendship between India and the Communist bloc must be fostered and economic and cultural ties between them expanded. The CPI was criticized directly for its conduct of the peace campaign, reminded of its obligations to world communism and told that regardless of its own domestic problems its policy had to be adjusted to the international Communist line, now keyed to the peace movement.

Moscow's demands were gratifying to the Joshi wing of the CPI, but they apparently aroused the hostility not only of the left extremists but also of the centrists, who, although opposed to armed revolt, were certainly not ready to call off opposition to the Congress Party or to put the struggle against the "American menace" ahead of the "freedom struggle" against the British.

The Andhra faction agreed that the US was the chief international enemy and should be combatted; they held, however, that struggle should be directed primarily against the chief national enemy, British imperialism—a struggle which could best take the form of armed opposition to the Congress Party. The centrists held much the same view, but assigned equal importance to the peace campaign and the struggle for national freedom.

Conflict at CPI's Third Congress

THE Third Congress of the CPI, which met in Madurai in southern India from December 7, 1953, to January 3, 1954, faced the difficult and vital task of reconciling these conflicting views. The Congress' decisions reflected the equal balance of forces: the centrists' views prevailed over those of the Andhra-led left extremists or of the Joshi faction. Thus, while the party avowed that the US was the main enemy of peace and an increasing threat to Indian freedom, Britain was castigated as the main enemy of Indian freedom. The struggle against "British imperialism" was to be intensified rather than slackened because India's foreign policy, while becoming increasingly independent, was still subject to "imperialist influence." In short, the CPI was to continue the "struggle for Indian freedom" through opposition by parliamentary means to the Congress Party regime, calling for its replacement by "democratic forces." [17]

Nearly a third of the delegates, however, considered even this almost classic compromise too far to the right. Out of a total of 294 delegates, 87 from Andhra and Bengal abstained from voting on the political resolution put before the Congress. This, plus the fact that the party congress did not approve the international Communist line in full, combined to leave little doubt that the CPI was far to the left of Moscow's current policy. Harry Pollitt, English Communist and Cominform representative at the Congress, was clearly disappointed. In his concluding speech he expressed extreme displeasure at the proceedings, accusing the leaders and delegates of discussing problems "as if India and the Communist Party of India were in complete isolation from the

[16] *The Statesman*, Overseas Edition, May 24, 1952, pp. 1, 4.

[17] See Ajoy Ghosh's review of the Third Party Congress in *New Age*, January 24, 1954.

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rest of the world." He was angered at the party's failure to recognize and face the "American threat":

After 7 days you discuss the US-Pakistan Pact, which is the most serious thing in the external situation concerning India. It is the USA which is the chief aggressor preparing for a third world war. This is a challenge to your party and mine. Both Britain and India hold the key to world peace. . . .[18]

The months following the Congress revealed the unresolved nature of the disputes concerning domestic as well as foreign policy. On the domestic scene, the Congress Party threw its support to the Socialists, who thereby were able to defeat the Communists. An election in Punjab and the East Patiala States Union (PEPSU) was won outright by the Congress Party. These setbacks added weight to the vociferous contention of Communist extremist elements that the CPI could never rise to power by constitutional means.

On the international level, the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) seemed to be taking shape, as both the US and Turkey concluded pacts with Pakistan. In Southeast Asia the first steps were taken to create SEATO. India and Burma were the vital links in the chain of these defense arrangements designed to restrain Communist expansion. But the Congress Party vehemently denounced the American military assistance agreement with Pakistan and SEATO. The Joshi faction, therefore, intensified its pressure for a new program of support to the government. The party was urged to drop the slogan for a coalition government and campaign instead for a government of "peace, democarcy and freedom." In other words, the Joshi faction recommended that the CPI drop as its key slogan its demand for the replacement of the Congress Party regime.

The Central Committee, meeting in September 1954, rejected this suggestion. Although recognizing the significance of events on the international level, the Central Committee refused to revise its basic attitude of opposition to the Congress Party declaring the government remained what it had been:

. . . a government of landlords and monopoly capitalists collaborating with British imperialism. This class character of the government is leading to greater attacks on the common people. None of the stands that the government has taken on (international issues) . . . can negate the character of the government.[19]

And further to intensify it:

There is no question of abandoning the struggle against the Congress Govt. . . . The task of the democratic forces, on the contrary is to intensify this struggle. Only by doing that will they be able to defend the interests of the common people and fight for a consistent policy of peace which is inseparably linked up with the struggle for breaking India's link-up with British imperialism.[20]

Nehru's Program Brings Consternation to CPI

ONLY 2 months later, however the Central Committee was forced to modify its position drastically—due in part to pressures from Moscow and in part to indications that the Congress Party was gaining increasing control of the internal situation. Nehru, addressing a Congress Party meeting in Avadi, announced that the Congress Party would launch a "socialistic" program in India, throwing the CPI into consternation. At the time, the Congress Party was leading a campaign of bitter denunciation against the CPI in Andhra, where elections were to be held in January 1955.

Meeting in November, the CPI Central Committee attempted to formulate a policy which would satisfy both the demands of this new internal situation and continued pressures from the Soviet Union. Present at the Congress to explain the latter was Ajoy Ghosh, recently returned from a triumphant visit to Moscow. The Central Committee at long last voted to abandon the position it had held since late 1947, insofar as foreign policy was concerned. The CPI would henceforth make no references to the Nehru government as the lackey through which the British continued their rule in India or to the foreign policy of India as one dictated by "imperialists." The party was to join in celebrating Independence Day and Republic Day instead of boycotting them and organizing "Quit-Commonwealth Days."

However, although the Indian Congress Party's pledge of a socialistic program provided a good excuse, the Central Committee refused to abandon its opposition to the government's domestic policies. Writing in *New Age* on December 2, Ajoy Ghosh himself declared that Nehru's domestic policy was a class policy contrary, for the most part, to the interests of the people, and that the CPI would spearhead a new movement aimed at replacing the Nehru government.

Irked at the party's continued oppositional role, the pro-Communist weekly, *Blitz*, on December 4, 1954, warned the Indian Communists that the facts required a reevaluation of their policy and program:

While Nehru, with his prestige at its zenith as the only independent statesman who stands out like a rock between Asia and American imperialism, is stated to be making an ambitious personal bid to transform the Congress into some sort of a National Front with the absorption of Socialists and other Leftist forces, the Communist Party

[18] *Communist Conspiracy . . .*, pp. 15 f.
[19] *New Age*, Sept. 19, 1954.
[20] *Ibid.*

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today stands regrettably isolated and divided and in some places discredited.

It is no secret that the party is riven by factions pulling the self-neutralized Centrists, the ruling groups, to the extreme Left, on the one side, and the extreme Right, on the other. Its membership is declining with desertions from the leadership no less than the rank and file. The party has lost the goodwill and confidence of fellow-travelling Marxists and progressives. . . .

They have two alternatives left now: Either they must go the whole Marxist hog with Ranadive back to Telangana and maybe suicide, or they must appreciate the wisdom of the Joshi line of an all-support—to Nehru front.

Citing criticism that the Indian Party was more of a liability and source of embarrassment to the Soviet Union and Communist China than an asset, *Blitz* suggested:

. . . the second alternative should appeal to those among the party who appreciate and want to further and not frustrate the cause of India-China-Russia friendship, which is on the brink of majestic fulfillment.

Seeing signs of a "progressive" change in the Congress Party's domestic policy as well as its foreign policy, *Blitz* declared that if such a change did not materialize "it is because Nehru is surrounded by reactionaries and isolated from . . . progressives" and that this "is the fault of the progressives no less than the reactionaries."

Conflicts Within CPI Embarrassing to Moscow

THE discrepancy between the Indian line and the international Communist line was no less an embarrassment for the CPI than for the USSR. On the occasion of Indian Republic Day, and on the eve of the signing of an important steel plant agreement between the Soviet Union and India, an editorial in *Pravda* on January 26, 1955, not only praised the foreign policy of the government of India, but also acknowledged that under Congress Party rule India was making great internal progress. This statement was made barely two weeks before the Andhra elections. The next CPI meeting took place in the latter part of June of this year, and its decisions constitute the basis of the current CPI stand. In brief the Central Committee concluded that the CPI should support India's foreign policy in general and extend support to selected aspects of the Congress Party's domestic policy, retaining at the same time its basic attitude of opposition to the government.

Addressing a press conference on June 29, at the close of the 13-day meeting, Ajoy Ghosh declared that while there had been a "welcome change" in India's foreign policy, its domestic policy was still "reactionary." At the same time, he endorsed the principles of the government's second 5-year plan, particularly its emphasis on heavy and basic industries. The party, he revealed, was no longer opposed to community development projects and national extension schemes, and henceforth would support projects sponsored or run by the government. To bring the plan "more in line with the interests of the masses," however, the party would propose to the government inclusion of the following points: (1) The fixing of a ceiling on the profits of private enterprises, the surplus to be taken as loans for financing development projects; (2) the abolishment of government allocations for the personal use of princely rulers (privy purses) and state acquirement of the princes' private property; (3) establishment of a state monopoly over foreign trade.

On June 30, 1955, the Central Committee issued a statement to the press characterizing the government's internal policies as "reactionary" and undemocratic. It declared that despite some increase in grain production, and limited gains under India's first 5-year plan, the condition of the vast majority of the people has not improved. It accused the government of refusing to implement basic changes necessary to place the country firmly in the path of progress, and of appeasing and protecting Indian and foreign vested interests. India's second 5-year plan was criticized for heavy concessions to landlordism and reliance on big capitalists. The CPI declared it would strive to unite all democratic opposition parties and elements and work to defeat the Congress Party in the next general elections in states where the Communists were the strongest.

Available documents indicate that the Central Committee's main political resolution also criticized many aspects of the government's economic planning. The government was accused of cooperating with British financial interests, and the Congress Party's talk of creating a "socialistic pattern of society" was derided.

Indian Communists' Dilemma

THE present CPI position serves as a glaring illustration of the fundamental conflict between the interests of world communism and those of an indigenous revolutionary movement. The Soviet Union conditions its support of native Communist parties on the degree to which they can be controlled and utilized to further Soviet national interests as the history of the CPI illustrates. The CPI is torn between a doctrinaire addiction to class struggle—whether in the pure "Marxist" form exemplified by Ranadive's faction, or in the "Maoist" version

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advocated by Rao—and loyalty to Moscow. In addition, it is confronted with the typical dilemmas faced by any antidemocratic party trying to achieve its aims within a democratic milieu. Differences over tactics are bound to arise, frustrations are unavoidable, and endless strife becomes the order of the day.

Moscow currently has no use for militant tactics. In its effort to appear as the most "peace loving" power on earth, it does not hesitate to jettison the very elements of Communist ideology which at one time fired the imagination of its supporters abroad. It demands the well-nigh inpossible: strict control over indigenous Communist parties and the latter's renunciation of their political *raison d'être*. This calls either for boundless cynicism on the part of rank-and-file members or for an almost irrational faith in the ultimate wisdom of the CPSU. Yet the members of the CPI evince neither of these tendencies. There are, of course, elements which demand a literal adherence to Soviet directives, and these are obviously either more naive or more opportunistic than the intransigent "leaftists"—probably the latter. But relatively few in the ranks of the CPI are amenable to every Soviet view. The gulf between Moscow's immediate interests and those of the CPI is still visibly large.

The dogged resistance offered by the bulk of the CPI undoubtedly has raised serious misgivings in Moscow concerning the Indian Party's primary loyalty, its discipline and, therefore, its present effectiveness as an instrument of international communism. If Moscow is to be placated, the slow painful shift which is taking place in the CPI line, bringing it closer to the international Communist line, will have to continue; Indian Communists will have to demonstrate beyond a doubt that they are Communists first and Indians afterward.

Communism and the Intelligentsia in Backward Areas: Some Recent Literature

By G. L. Arnold

Editors' Note: As a general rule, writers prefer the term "underdeveloped areas" in describing those parts of the world which are nonindustrialized or only in the early stages of industrialization. In the following article, however, Mr. Arnold has substituted the term "backward areas" for a special reason which he explains in these words: "From a methodological viewpoint, the term 'underdeveloped' is open to objection, unless it is made clear whether the reference is to resources or to social institutions. Some countries which are politically and socially 'underdeveloped' are rich in terms of their actual or potential resources. In general it is far from clear that economic 'development' is necessarily the best cure for structural disharmonies. See on this subject 'An Interpretation of Economic Backwardness,' by H. Myint, *Oxford Economic Papers*, June 1954."

The author, until recently editor of the *Twentieth Century*, London, has contributed to the *British Journal of Sociology*, the *Political Quarterly*, and other publications. A book-length study entitled "The Pattern of World Conflict" will be published later this year by the Dial Press, New York, and Allen & Unwin, London.

ANY discussion of communism in backward areas must necessarily touch at some point on the role of the intelligentsia, for in the absence of a well-developed middle class able to sponsor political movements of its own, leadership in the national-revolutionary movement inevitably tends to fall to the intellectuals as a group. The role of this group has recently become a subject of discussion among scholars and political analysts, and the present paper attempts a critical survey of some of the more cogent literature on the subject.

In this context, the understanding of Soviet experience occupies a central place, since the Soviet Union itself can be regarded as an example of an economically backward country catapulted into an

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advanced state of industrialism. Virtually all analysts of Soviet affairs share the conviction that the Russian Revolution, notably in its later, Stalinist phase, has created a new dominant social class variously referred to as "the bureaucracy," "the managers," or "the technical intelligentsia," and that the Soviet Communist Party is now predominantly an organization of this new, socially privileged stratum.[1] Although opinions differ on the extent to which the autocracy responds to the pressures of this group, it is generally agreed that both the state and the party apparatus have been remodelled to serve its interests. There seems little doubt that this key role of the Soviet intelligentsia in a planned economy geared to speedy industrialization holds a special appeal for the intelligentsia of those countries of Asia, the Near East, and Latin America which have not yet been industrialized to the level of the USSR. This appeal helps to account for the phenomenon of Communist infiltration into the nationalist movements of countries recently freed from colonial tutelage, for nationalist politics in such areas are very largely intelligentsia politics.

The problems of Soviet politics cannot, of course, be projected in any simple way onto the political scene of such countries, for the latter have not yet reached the stage where the managerial element could be expected to play an important role. But the experience of the USSR is nonetheless relevant, because communism tries to telescope two different stages in the revolutionary process: the "bourgeois-democratic" phase of revolt against pre-modern society (colonialism)—*and* the Stalinist managerial "revolution from above," typically effected after the capture of power by the intelligentsia. Western comment upon the resulting complex of attitudes within this group frequently takes the form of more or less irritable reflections on its political immaturity. Even a trained observer like Klaus Mehnert is more concerned with the psychology of the intellectuals than with the objective role of the intelligentsia as a group.[2] In consequence, he makes too much of side issues like "anti-Americanism" and "anti-Westernism," or the rootlessness of newly emancipated members of the professional class; he fails to make clear the positive attraction of state-controlled economic planning for this largely unemployed or underemployed group.

[1] Almost all postwar studies on the USSR deal to some extent with this interesting problem of the status of the Soviet managerial elite. See, *e. g.:* Franz Borkenau, *European Communism*, London and New York, 1953; Boris Meissner, *Russland im Umbruch* (Russia in Upheaval), Frankfort on Main, 1951; Jules Monnerot, *Sociologie du Communisme* (Sociology of Communism), Paris, 1949; Raymond Aron, *Le Grand Schisme* (The Great Schism), Paris, 1948; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Pattern of Communist Revolution*, London, 1953; Klaus Mehnert, *Weltrevolution durch Weltgeschichte* (World Revolution Through World History), 1951, published in English under the title *Stalin Verus Marx*, London, 1952; G. F. Achminov, *Die Macht im Hintergrund* (The Unseen Force), Ulm, 1950; W. W. Rostow, *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1952.

Intelligentsia Leads New Labor Movement

IT is rare to come across a scholarly investigation of intelligentsia politics such as George E. Lichtblau's "Politics of Trade Union Leadership in Southern Asia" (*World Politics*, October 1954). The special value of Lichtblau's study lies in its close analysis of the social factors making for a type of labor leadership unknown in Western countries. A new, politically conscious labor movement "led by a highly volatile and intensely nationalistic educated group" has sprung up to challenge the traditional, boss-run pseudo-unions dominated by members of the old ruling class, or by organizers who are little better than gangsters. It is fashionable today to hold this new labor leadership responsible for all the ailments of the new nation-states of Southern Asia. But what Lichtblau demonstrates is that this group, quite irrespective of its political affiliations (and most members of this stratum are not Communists), is the only one capable, under present conditions, of giving any direction to the nascent labor movement. For a genuine, grassroots trade union leadership simply does not exist in any significant strength. Its absence is not due to political manipulation but rather reflects the immaturity of the working class in nonindustrial countries: specifically, the poverty, ignorance, and traditional submissiveness of the rank and file. Only a mature proletariat can develop a home-grown union leadership answerable to the members.

In the absence of such a stratum, trade union politics in Southern Asia (and, one may add, in North Africa and the Middle East, Israel excepted) are an aspect of national-revolutionary politics. Nor does it make much difference whether the country in question is politically independent or subject to foreign control. In the latter case, there is indeed a special reason for the revolutionary intelligentsia to enter labor politics, since most other avenues are closed to it. The unions thus tend to become the "mass basis" of the nationalist movement. This is a development that can be seen

[2] "Die Rolle der Intelligenz in Suedasien" (The Role of the Intelligentsia in South Asia), *Osteuropa*, October 1953.

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most closely perhaps in Tunisia—an area not discussed by Lichtblau. The winning of political independence, however, merely enables the dominant group of nationalist intellectuals to combine control of the labor movement with manipulation of the state apparatus. This has in fact happened all over Southeast Asia and is one source of that area's problem. "A large proportion of the labor leadership already occupies management and high civil service positions." [3] Since political issues frequently turn upon the question of how far economic planning by the state shall be pushed, it is naturally of the highest importance for the ruling faction to have control of organized labor. Conversely, the fact that nationalist regimes can maintain themselves in power only by appealing to the workers tends to give a Socialist coloration to their nationalism. "Thus the Western-oriented democratic leadership manifests an ambivalence in which its preferred attachment to the political and social principles of parliamentary democracy and constitutional government may yet be sacrificed to an intense drive for industrialization." [4] For "it is precisely the appeal of communism in underdeveloped areas that it assigns to the educated and uprooted *avant-garde* a key role in the transformation of a 'colonial' agrarian society into an industrial one." [5]

It appears to be the author's view that, from a democratic standpoint, the solution consists in playing for time until a *nonpolitical* union leadership has grown up. Such a leadership, he implies, would be capable of shaking off the stranglehold now exercized by the class of professional politicians whose personal and group preferences determine whether a given area shall belong to the Soviet camp or to the democratic world. This, however, involves a circle: for the emergence of a "nonpolitical" type of union leadership would in fact require political decisions—namely, the acceptance by labor of the *status quo*, and the parallel renunciation by the intelligentsia of its present efforts to guide the evolution of society along socialist lines.

Anticapitalist Intellectuals

THE difficulties in the way of securing such decisions have been briefly but succinctly indicated by Mr. Morris Watnick, in a paper entitled "The Appeal of Communism to the Underdeveloped Peoples." [6] Mr Watnick probably has done more than any other recent writer in this field to illuminate the deeper causes of colonial "unrest" and the link between agrarian disintegration and revolutionary intelligentsia politics. He does not assume, as do many people, that all will be well if capital investment in backward areas is stepped up. He recognizes that unregulated capitalist development normally falls with destructive impact on the archaic organition of the older countries:

Their internal cohesiveness, largely centered on self-sufficient village economies, has been disrupted by enforced contact with the West, giving way to a network of commercialized money transactions in which the strategic incidence of economic activity has shifted from subsistence agriculture to plantation production of raw materials and foodstuffs for the world market. Their economies thus took on a distorted character which rendered the material well-being of the native populations peculiarly subject to the cyclical fluctuations of the world market. [7]

Revolutionary nationalist movements therefore took on a socialist coloration, since the native entrepreneurial classes were too weak to exercise a dominant role. Watnick stresses that the conditions under which the nationalist movements have developed have made them susceptible to Communist influence:

Western capitalism was necessarily excluded from their range of choices, if for no other reason than that its linkage with imperialist rule over their own societies debarred it from their hierarchy of values. The anticapitalist animus is common to the intellectual spokesmen of these areas, whatever their specific political allegiances may be. [8]

In consequence, the Communist parties in these countries have attracted thousands of middle-class intellectuals, and have in turn adapted themselves to the special conditions of the areas. [9]

There is little chance, on this analysis, that the Communist hold over such nationalist movements will be broken by appeals to follow the Western model. Apart from memories of colonial rule, the preconditions of Western-type economic development simply do not exist. The real question is whether leadership of the revolutionary movement can be assumed by a non-Communist group that is not obviously Fascist: for it must be remembered that rejection of Western democracy can also take the form of Fascist nationalism. The example of Kemalist Turkey demonstrates that state-capitalist tutelage is

[3] Lichtblau, "Politics of Trade Union Leadership In Southern Asia," *World Politics*, October 1954, p. 99.
[4] *Ibid* p. 100.
[5] *Ibid*, p. 89.
[6] Morris Watnick, "The Appeal of Communism to the Underdeveloped Peoples" in *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas*, B. Hoselitz, editor, Chicago, 1952.
[7] *Ibid*, p. 153-4.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 159.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

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compatible with political development of a type that fits a country for eventual membership in the democratic club—on condition, however, that the agrarian problem is not too unmanageable.

Economic Development: A Political Dilemma

THE ultimate political development of agrarian countries, however, may depend less on purely political decisions than on the way in which the thorny economic problems of those areas are handled. The fundamental problem of industrialization has been brought into focus by Prof. W. Arthur Lewis, a leading British economist who stands on the moderate wing of socialism. His paper, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor" is too lengthy and intricate to be summarized in this space.[10] What it comes down to is that if an agrarian country is to be industrialized rapidly and effectively, surplus capital has to be placed into the hands of the industrialist class, for only this class has the incentive and the predisposition to reinvest in investment goods. The peasant wants to have more land, not more capital on his land. The merchant wants to have a wider margin, or a quicker turnover, neither of which increases fixed capital. The banker wants more deposits. Only the industrialist's passion drives towards using profits to create a bigger empire of bricks and steel.

The economic necessities of industrial development thus entail a political dilemma. For from Professor Lewis' argument it follows that if industrialism is to be speeded up, the capitalist sector, whether privately or publicly controlled, must be enabled to make more profits. But to do this, it is not enough to restrict the profit-making opportunities of landlords and merchants: the incomes of workers and peasants must also be held down until such time as the whole economy has lifted itself by its bootstraps to a new level where the national income permits the expansion of living standards along with profits. The credit expansion necessary for capitalist formation in this interim period will cause inflation and thus endanger even more the real income of farmers and workers. The crucial political problem is how this stage can be passed under democratic management. Put more generally, the problem posed by Professor Lewis' analysis is whether democratic control in a backward country is compatible with a rapid rate of industrial progress.

There is at first sight something extremely disconcerting about an approach that lays so much stress on the rate of capital investment. Pessimistic conclusions easily suggest themselves, *e.g.*, if rapid industrialization calls for extensive state action, a premium is put on authoritarian (and by inference on totalitarian) forms of control, especially if it is necessary to compel farmers and workers to accept a reduced standard of living.

A way out of this economic-political dilemma has been suggested by Prof. Eugene Staley, who points to various neglected sources of new capital.[11] Chief among these are the large funds immobilized by "conspicuous consumption" on the part of the wealthier classes. Considerable sums go into luxurious living at home and abroad. Were these surpluses somehow channeled into developmental investment, they would in many countries substantially increase capital formation without reducing the consumption of the mass of the population.[12] Staley also cites the tightening of "technological slack" and "labor slack" as other potential sources of surpluses that can be made available by the introduction of efficiency and by a little outside stimulation. Taxation is of course an obvious means of discouraging wasteful expenditures. The important point to be kept in mind is that all such measures are fully compatible with democratic processes.

Indian Socialists are inclined to argue that industrialization on the Western model is not a proper goal for a country like India at all. Mr. Asoka Mehta suggests that there can be a distinctively Asian path to economic development, a path which would concentrate on agriculture and deliberately renounce the aim of catching up with more developed countries:[13]

In the peasant sector of the economy, land distribution, village-oriented economy and voluntary labor for rural public works would provide opportunities for full employment. In handicrafts, better tools, adequate raw materials, cooperatives for credit and marketing, and protection against developed industries would provide increased and secure employment. In developed industries, insofar as *that* sector is concerned, the Keynesian multiplier would work. Each level has to seek its appropriate "full employment."

It may be objected that this kind of policy would work better in a country with a sizable economic surplus than in India, and even that hostility to industry may eventually have the effect of crippling agriculture. One may also recall that the Narodniks had similar aims for Russia, and that when their hour

[10] Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," *The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies*, May 1954.

[11] Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries*, New York and London, 1954, Pt. III, Ch. 13, "Capital Formation."

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 263.

[13] Asoka Mehta, "Can India Industrialize Democratically?", *Dissent*, spring and summer issues 1955, New York.

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came they somehow failed to put their program across.[14] Perhaps their Indian counterparts will be more fortunate. We have after all learned a great deal since then, both about the operation of a mixed economy and about the dangers of headlong industrialization under dictatorial control.

Totalitarianism a Deadly Solution

WHATEVER the precise path of economic development taken by underdeveloped countries, there will remain the formidable problem of reshaping the attitudes of those key groups upon whose performance economic progress depends. Politically, the problem is how this reshaping can be done under a democratic form of government which excludes the authoritarian manipulation of popular attitudes through an all-embracing system of propaganda and control. Perhaps the best answer that can be given at this date is that the process will inevitably be somewhat slower than under totalitarianism.

Yet the element of planning will enter no matter what the political philosophy:

A country which chooses the democratic path to economic development must devise new and effective methods of capital formation which at the same time are democratic in spirit.[15]

The operative words are clearly "chooses" and "devise." Choices cannot be made by "the country" as a whole, at least at the present stage, but only by its politically conscious minority, *i.e.*, by the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia's belief or disbelief in the efficacy of the democratic process thus turns out to be the crucial element in the situation. Nor is this necessarily cause for lament. Intellectuals, after all, are trained to think, and thinking may yet suggest to them that totalitarianism is only one "solution" among others, and a rather deadly one at that.

[14] The Narodniks, as we know, advocated a Socialist system based on the indigenous Russian village commune (*mir*) and brought about by the peasants rather than by the industrial proletariat. The essentials of this program were adopted in the early 20th century by the Social Revolutionaries, who, it will be recalled, won a majority of votes to the democratic Constituent Assembly after the March 1917 revolution, but failed—partly through lack of efficient organization—to put their program into effect before the Bolshevik *coup* of November 1917.

[15] Staley, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

Brazil's CP: A Case Study in Latin-American Communism

By Robert J. Alexander

SINCE World War II the Communist Party of Brazil has been the largest and most influential Stalinist group anywhere in the American hemisphere. A survey of its activities is important not only as a case study of regional Communist strategy but as a subject of vital significance considering the key location, size, rapid development and growing weight in international affairs of the United States of Brazil.

The postwar strategy and tactics of the Brazilian CP, like those of virtually all Communist parties, fall roughly into two periods demarcated by the emergence of Moscow's "cold war" in earnest. The wide divergencies in the Brazilian Communists' policies and appeals in these two periods, and the seeming ease with which the switch was effected, demonstrate the dangerous flexibility and expedience of local Communist movements and, in particular, their willingness to adapt to the foreign policy needs of the Soviet Union.

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The Early Postwar Period: The Drive for a Mass Movement

THE Brazilian Communists emerged from World War II with full legal status for the first time in many years. The legitimization of the party was the result of a relaxation of the dictatorship of Getulio

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Vargas and an agreement—tacit or otherwise—between Vargas and the Communist leadership. At the time Vargas, Brazil's dictator-president from 1930–45, faced widespread opposition, spearheaded by a faction of military leaders whom the Communists also considered enemies. Presumably in return for their new legality, the Communists supported Vargas in a campaign to postpone presidential elections promised for December 1945. Although Vargas was overthrown by a military *coup* in October 1945 (and elections subsequently were held as scheduled), the Communists were allowed to continue as a legitimate party for another 18 months.

During these two years of its legal existence, the Brazilian CP concentrated on building up a mass political following as rapidly as possible. Its efforts succeeded in large measure, as was shown by a report on the membership of the party at its Third National Conference in mid-1946. Diógenes Arruda, Secretary of Organization, revealed that in 1943, when the party held an illegal Second National Conference, it had only 800 to 900 members. In April 1945, when the party was granted legal status, it had 3,100 members. This figure rose to 25,000 by August, and 82,000 by December 1945. By the time of Arruda's report it had reached 100,000.[1] Soon afterward it was to reach 130,000.[2] *(When the party was in effect declared illegal in 1947, its membership dropped abruptly. A new membership drive in 1953–54 brought party membership again over the 100,000 mark.—Editors.)*

The rapid increase in party ranks was due in no small measure to the personal "mística" of the Brazilian Communists' leader, Luiz Carlos Prestes. In the middle 1920's Prestes—not then a Communist—had inspired a military insurrection in Brazil which had developed into a guerrilla war. Prestes personally led a small group of rebels back and forth across the interior of the country for more than two years, beating every force sent against him and attempting to arouse the rural workers against the semifeudal landlordism which dominated the country at that time. After his famed "Column" was finally broken up, Prestes went into exile. He emerged seven years later to lead an abortive rebellion which resulted in his incarceration for nine years more. Since he thus had little chance to mix in the rough and tumble of politics, the Prestes legend remained untarnished. As a result, he emerged from jail in 1945 as a popular national hero. He travelled widely, helping to organize local units of the Communist Party and thousands of "Prestistas" became party members, more out of allegiance to him than because of any belief in the principles of the party.[3]

While exploiting the personal appeal of Prestes, the Communist Party adopted a course designed to attract a maximum following in minimum time. Its four-pronged policy consisted of: (1) Playing down the doctrinaire aims of communism and concentrating instead on the immediate issues facing the Brazilian workers and lower middle class; (2) in particular, infiltrating the labor movement through activity in the trade unions; (3) appealing to other groups of the population on the basis of a program of "national union;" and (4) actively cooperating with and wooing the government, whose toleration was necessary to the Communists. Prestes summed up the "line" of the party during this period at its Third National Conference in the summer of 1946 (the first held after its emergence into legality). He declared:

We must organize the masses on the basis of their immediate needs. We must speak less of the agrarian reforms, of the democratic-bourgeois revolution, and speak more of these immediate needs, and work with the people to fulfill them. A crisis will determine when we have come to the moment when palliatives are no longer of any value. . . Then basic measures will be indispensable. . . . These can only be taken when the people are sufficiently organized to demand them.[4]

Labor Movement Prime Target of Communists

A prime target of the Communists was the labor movement. To appreciate the party's tactics, it is necessary to understand the labor apparatus set up by Vargas between 1937–45, when he attempted to organize Brazil as a corporate state (Estado Novo). That system provided for the establishment of national union confederations in every industry but made no provision for regional labor groups or for a central labor organization. Only the government-sanctioned confederations were entitled to sign collective bargaining contracts and to use a Labor Court system for the settling of grievances and for the changing of wages, hours and working conditions.

[1] *A Classe Operaria*, central organ of the Partido Communista do Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, July 20, 1946.

[2] Interview by author with Luiz Carlos Prestes in Rio de Janeiro, August 27, 1946.

[3] Two biographies of Prestes are particularly recommended: Abguar Bastos' *Prestes e a Revolucao Social*, Editorial Calvino, Rio de Janeiro, 1946; and Jorge Amado's *Vide de Luis Carlos Prestes*, Libreria Martins, Sao Paulo, undated.

[4] *A Classe Operaria, op. cit.*

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In mid-1945 the Communists organized a sort of labor general staff, the Movimento Unificador Trabalhista (MUT). This group summoned state labor conferences, which set up permanent state organizations. It also planned the calling of a national labor congress. But while the MUT was implicitly a violation of the Vargas blueprint, the Communists were careful not to attack the fundamental structure of the corporate state labor apparatus. In other words, they did not try to organize lower-echelon trade unions in competition with those established under government sponsorship. Rather they set out to win over the rank-and-file membership of the government-sanctioned unions. During this period they also supported the government's compulsory "trade union tax" which all workers had to pay regardless of whether they belonged to the union in their industry. [5]

The reason for these tactics was fairly obvious. In order to make rapid headway in the labor movement, the Communist Party had at least to be tolerated by the government. Because of the tight control established over the unions by the Estado Novo labor legislation, the government's word was likely to be final in the settlement of any labor dispute of importance. At the same time, the Communists' best means of attracting mass support was to be able to claim a hand in the winning of concrete benefits for the workers, whose situation was critical because of serious inflation in Brazil at that time. Thus the Communists' aim was to seize the leadership of the unions, while remaining within the fringes of the law and maintaining as good relations as possible with the government.

The Communists' collaboration with Vargas has already been shown. They were less successful in courting Vargas' successor, Gen. Eurico Gaspar Dutra, who won the Presidency in the December 1945 elections and whose administration soon after declared the MUT illegal. Nevertheless, the party declared at its meeting a few months later:

The Third National Conference reaffirms the position assumed by the PCB toward the government, of frank and decided support of its democratic acts, and intransent opposition—within the limits of peace and legality—against any retrocession.[6]

The MUT already had won a considerable following, however, and when it finally called a national labor congress for September 1946, the government was compelled to deal with it on equal terms. The labor congress was held under the joint sponsorship of the Ministry of Labor and the MUT. When it came to nought because of controversy between pro-government and pro-Communist delegates, the latter formed the Confederacão de Trabalhadores do Brasil and affiliated it with the Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina, the continental Communist labor group. The Communists tried to smooth over differences with the Dutra regime, however, by seeking official sanction for their new organization.

The Communists continued courting the government until Moscow threw down the gage of the "cold war," pitting the Soviet orbit against the free world. With this development in the international situation, the Brazilian Communists abruptly ended their attempts to collaborate with the government, which was friendly toward the United States. Reversing their stand, they went into implacable opposition to the Dutra regime.

Debut of the "National Union"

MEANWHILE, along with concentrating its energies on the labor movement, the party also strove to enhance its appeal among the population at large. To this end it curtailed talk of "revolution" and of the ultimate objective of a "Socialist" or "Communist" economy, and substituted a line advocating "national union" and "class collaboration," stressing the possibility of all "progressive forces" of the nation working together. This phase of party policy is of particular interest since it foreshadowed the strategy subsequently prescribed for virtually all Communist parties in underdeveloped areas. (See introductory article by B. Morris and M. Watnick, p. 1.—*Editors*.) At the 1946 party conference, Prestes stated the party's position on National Union as follows:

The National Union is possible with honest, patriotic and progressive men . . . who wish that our country go forward. Even among the landlords a good proportion of the liberals can work with us until we raise the standard of the agrarian reform. We do not foresee the immediate division of the land, but only wish to assure the rural workers humane labor conditions. . . . The bourgeoisie will be the first to understand the necessity of avoiding armed clashes and of finding pacific solutions to the country's principal problems. We are with the landless peasants

[5] Since 60 percent of the revenue from this tax (which amounted to one day's wage per worker annually) went to trade union treasuries, the Communists supported it presumably in the hope that eventual control of the unions would make this fund available for party work inside and outside the labor movement. When, in June of 1946, the Socialists introduced a measure in Congress to abolish the trade union tax, it was violently opposed by Communist deputy João Amazonas. (See *Vanguarda Socialista*, Brazilian Socialist periodical, Rio de Janeiro, July 30, 1946.)

[6] *A Classe Operaria, op. cit.*

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in their most urgent demands, but at the same time we back the progressive national bourgeoisie when it wishes to liquidate the remains of feudalism, to develop capitalism, with the collaboration of the proletariat.[7]

The nondoctrinaire, indeed conciliatory, approach of the Communists was again emphasized by Prestes in an interview in October 1946. Asked "Does your party favor the establishment of socialism or communism immediately in Brazil?", Prestes replied:

Absolutely no. We believe in socialism, of course, but not socialism now. Brazil is a backward country, as are the other countries of Latin America. Communists are not fighting capitalism now; they are fighting feudalism. We are not opposed to foreign capital. We are in favor of the rapid industrialization of our country. We are only against that type of foreign capital which is against our country, which tries to exploit us.[8]

The latter part of this statement would, of course, have been heresy a few years later, since foreign capital meant in large measure US capital. But in 1946 the cold war was still only a rumble on the horizon, and East-West tensions were still tolerable. The Brazilian Communists made no attempt, however, to hide the fact that their primary loyalty lay with the USSR.

In an interview with this writer in August 1946, Prestes (enlarging on a previous press statement) characterized a war between the US and the USSR as "unthinkable;" nevertheless he stated that if war should come, any conflict with the "workers' state," the Soviet Union, would be an attack upon workers all over the world, and if Brazil sided with the US, the workers of Brazil should do all they could to aid the Soviet Union.[9]

This international position of the Communist Party sometimes proved embarrassing because the Brazilian people were basically friendly toward the United States. However, during this period the party put very little emphasis on international affairs confining most of its propaganda and activity to internal problems.

To sum up, the policies of the Brazilian Communists during the immediate postwar period can be listed as follows:

1. Exploitation of Prestes' role as a national hero, to the end of building up party membership as rapidly as possible.
2. Concentration on internal Brazilian affairs in propaganda and action.
3. Special attention to work among the industrial workers, where the Communists came to share trade union leadership with the followers of Vargas.
4. Appeasement of the government.
5. Advocacy of reformism rather than revolution.
6. Stress on national unity.

The Big Switch

THE emergence and intensification of the "cold war" caused a virtual transformation of these policies and tactics. The Communist Party came to devote most of its propaganda to international affairs, specifically carrying on a violent campaign against the United States. At the same time, it turned bitterly against the Brazilian government and actively prepared the ground for a revolutionary movement and the establishmet of a "people's democracy." In short, the party shifted to a policy more openly designed to serve the interests of the USSR.

Some might be tempted to attribute the Communists' policy turnabout to internal developments in Brazil—particularly their switch to violent opposition to the governments of President Dutra and later of President Vargas (who again took office in 1950). For in 1947 the Dutra regime took drastic action against the Communists. In May 1947, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in a decision upholding a government suit charging the Communist Party with having an unconstitutional program, banned the party from the list of legal parties entitled to run candidates for elections. In a parallel action President Dutra suspended the Brazilian Workers Confederation and its affiliates for spreading "friction and agitation" among workers. Two days later, on May 9, 1947, the police announced they had virtually completed a drive to close all Communist offices and 445 party clubs.

That these actions by the government were not the cause of the Communists' switch in policy can be demonstrated, however, by several facts. First, the party's policy reversal did not come until two years after the party was outlawed. Second, outlawing the party did not seriously hamper the functioning of the organization. Its principal daily newspaper, *Tribuna Popular*, was suppressed, but almost immediately it was succeeded by *Imprensa Popular*, which is still published daily and can be bought in news kiosks in Rio de Janeiro. Other Communist papers

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[7] *A Classe Operaria*, op. cit. This line of the Brazilian Communists compares closely with similar positions taken by the Communists in Mexico, where they got the Confederacion de Trabajadoees de Mexico, in which they still had some influence, to enter into an accord with the National Manufacturers' Association. Those of Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and other countries also stressed the "National Union" theme at this same time.

[8] *US News and World Report*, Washington, D. C., October 8, 1946.

[9] Interview with Prestes by author, *op. cit.*

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appear regularly in provincial cities. Furthermore, no serious attempt ever was made to arrest Communist leaders, as was ordered by the government. This fact is shown by an editorial in *Correio da Manha* of Rio de Janeiro late in 1953 which noted:

It is now 3 years since the criminal courts ordered the apprehension of Luiz Carlos Prestes and other Communists, indicted under the law. . . . However, only two of the accused have been picked up, one working tranquilly at his job in this city; the other, due to his having committed new and subsequent crimes, is serving his penalty in the Seventh Military Region jail. The rest are at liberty, freely moving about, writing in periodicals under their own names, speaking at meetings, organizing and launching strikes. . . .[10]

The Communists were even able to elect party members to Congress and lesser legislative bodies. Roberto Morena, for example, was elected to Congress and was openly recognized as the party's representative there, although elected on another ticket.[11]

The key to the Communists' vituperation against the Dutra and Vargas governments in the late 1940's and early 1950's is not to be found in the restraints to which they were subjected by those governments. The real cause was the hardening of the cold war and the fact that both the Dutra and Vargas governments aligned themselves generally with the United States in the conflict.

Prestes himself, in a "mea culpa" article published in the Cuban Communist periodical *Fundamentos* in 1949, made no bones of the "why" and "how" of the party's switchover. After accusing the Brazilian Communist leadership—including himself—of having been guilty of "dangerous opportunist and reformist tendencies," Prestes said:

We did not realize early enough the great alterations which had occurred in the international arena after the end of the war. We had insisted on the possibility of peace by means of agreements among the Big Three, without seeing the division of the world into two camps and the necessity of establishing the democratic organizations for the struggle for peace.

Prestes concluded the article with a notification that the Communist Party in Brazil was switching its policy to conform with the Kremlin's "cold war" line:

At the head of the great working class masses in the fight for the independence and the progress of the fatherland, we will increase more and more the revolutionary character of our party; we shall show in practice that we are the only party of real opposition in the country, the only party capable of firm struggle against the dictator Dutra and his government of businessmen, against police terror, against Ademar de Barros and other reactionary rulers, against North American imperialism and the total colonization of Brazil. Organizing and directing the masses in this struggle, we shall hold ourselves ready to lead the people and direct whatever spontaneous struggles may arise as a consequence of the situation through which we are now passing.[12]

The Anti-US Campaign

THENCEFORTH the Brazilian Communist Party concentrated its full attention on attacking the United States, and on preparations for an attempt to seize power in Brazil. In the labor movement, among the peasants, in election campaigns and in legislative bodies, every move of the party and its fronts was aimed either at fanning hatred of "Yankee imperialism" or at setting the stage for a "war of national liberation" to place the party in power, whenever the moment seemed propitious. The party's inflammatory activity was carried on, curiously enough, under the banner of the "struggle for peace," the slogan coined by Moscow to disguise the imperialist nature of its "cold war." The new line of the Brazilian Communist Party was clearly stated in a resolution by the Plenum of the National Committee of the party which met early in 1951. The resolution said:

The National Committee recommends to the whole Party the necessity of arousing the masses, first of all, to the common struggle against the warmongers, against the sending of 20,000 Brazilians to Korea, against war credits, against the new military draft law, in a word in the struggle for peace, which is *our principal duty* {Author's italics}. To amplify and increase the will to struggle for peace in our country, it is necessary to know how to associate it with the daily struggles of the masses, with the fight against all forms of fascist reaction, in defense of the conquests and rights of the workers, in defense of the democratic liberties, against terrorist legislation, against all concessions of the government to imperialism and particularly today against the Conference of Foreign Ministers, a war and colonization conference.[13]

The relationship of the line of the Brazilian Communists to the Soviet "cold war" line was made manifest in an article by Diogenes Arruda, member of the party's National Secretariat and editor of its

[10] Editorial in *Correio da Manha*, Rio de Janeiro daily newspaper, October 18, 1953.

[11] Interview with Roberto Morena, in Rio de Janeiro, June 10, 1953.

[12] Luiz Carlos Prestes, "La Politica del P. C. del Brazil," *Fundamentos*, Havana, Cuba, February 1949.

[13] "As Tarefas Atuais dos Comunistas na Luta Pela Paz e Pela Independencia," *Problemas*, Rio de Janeiro, March-April 1951. (The conference of Foreign Ministers referred to was the two week meeting on defense and economic problems held in Washington beginning March 26, 1951, by the foreign ministers of the 21 American Republics.)

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periodical *Problemas*. Writing in that periodical on the subject of "Our Party, Our Tactics, Our Present Responsibilities," Arruda said:

We must liberate Brazil from the imperialist yoke and overthrow the feudal-bourgeois dictatorship, the servant of imperialism, and substitute for this government of betrayal, of war and of terror against the people, a government of popular democracy which will take the country out of the camp of imperialism and put it in the democratic camp headed by the Soviet Union.[14]

In order to deliver Brazil to the camp headed by the Soviet Union, the party leaders felt it incumbent to picture the USSR as the champion of world peace and of peaceful coexistence—catch phrases which Moscow propagandists were broadcasting tirelessly to a skeptical world. Prestes, writing in the official organ of the Argentine Communist Party, said:

We Communists must spare nothing to make known to the masses the peace policy of the Soviet Union, which is trying to put an end to the action of the fomenters of war. For this purpose it is indispensable that we untiringly put before the masses in the most concrete and simple way the traditional policy of peace of the Soviet Government, its attempts at peaceful coexistence of different political and economic systems and their successive peace proposals. It is indispensable to show the contrast between the peace policy of the USSR and the aggressive policy of the Government of the United States.[15]

Wooing the Middle Classes

IN pushing their new "line" the Brazilian Communist leaders took advantage of the universal desire for a lessening of international tensions to enlist supporters from areas outside the peasants and workers' group. João Amazonas, a party leader, wrote:

Without hiding our revolutionary position, for which we must gain the working class and the oppressed majority of the nation, we must know how to unite and organize the great masses of the people to save the peace, independently of the party or group to which each belongs. Even people who until now have been most unfriendly to us can and must be attracted by the great cause of the struggle against war. It is in this sense that the partisans of peace act, and the Communist Party gives them all of its aid.[16]

Through the party itself and its various fronts the Brazilian Communists went to work to proselytize the "most unfriendly" people. The results of their missionary work were reported by Andre Silva Paraguassu in an article first published in *Kommunist*, the political magazine of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and later republished in the Brazilian Communist magazine *Problemas*. He wrote:

The movement of the partisans of peace is being developed among new elements of the Brazilian population. In the struggle for peace there are participating actively eminent political personalities and members of the National Congress, intellectuals, university professors, writers and celebrated artists and representatives of all religious faiths.[17]

With cynical disregard for the glaring inconsistency, the Brazilian Communist leaders coupled their so-called "struggle for peace" campaign with a direct appeal to the nationalism of intellectuals, the military and the middle classes, based almost entirely on a virulent attack on the United States.

The hate campaign of the Brazilian "partisans of peace" was doubled-barreled: one barrel was aimed at the United States, the other at the Brazilian Government itself. Here is a salvo from the November-December 1952 issue of *Problemas:*

We affirm that the "Military Accord" (a mutual defense pace between Brazil and the US) completely submits the Brazilian forces to the control of American imperialists, who are seeking to transform these forces into a mercenary corps under the command of Yankee generals and officers, to be used not only against the Korean and other free peoples, but even against our own people, who are opposed to imperialist war and have already demonstrated that they are not disposed to die slowly of famine or be enslaved by the fascists and agents of American imperialism.

We emphasize too that by the terms of the new "Accord" the Vargas government hands over gratuitously to American imperialism all of the riches of the nation, opens completely the doors of the country to the invasion of all kinds of Yankee agents and spies under the cloak of diplomatic immunity, and cynically violates the laws of the country, assuring the agents of Yankee imperialism extraterritorial rights and freedom from control by our courts.[18]

The Brazilian Communists seized upon all issues which they thought could be used to rally Brazilian national sentiment and opinion against the United States. They sought constantly to picture the United States as "warmongering," "aggressive" and as bent on turning Brazil into a colony. The economic frustrations arising from rapid industrialization, a somewhat rachitic agriculture, and international economic complications were used by the Communists in their feverish efforts to put upon the shoulders of the "Yankee imperialists" the blame for any and all of the misfortunes experienced by Brazil.

[14] Diogenes Arruda, "Nosso Partido, Nossa Tatica, Nossas Tarefas Atuais," *Problemas*, Rio de Janeiro, March–April 1951.

[15] Luiz Carlos Prestes, "La Lucha por la Paz, Nuestra Tarea Central, y Decisiva," *Problemas*, Rio de Janeiro, May–June 1952.

[16] João Amazonas, "Pela Paz, Pela Libertacao Nacional," *Problemas*, Rio de Janeiro, July–August 1951.

[17] Andre Silva Paraguassu, "A Luta dos Trabalhadores do Brasil Contro O Jugo Imperialista dos Estados Unidos," *Problemas*, Rio de Janeiro, November-December 1952.

[18] "Assegurar O Exito da Preparacao do Congresso dos Povos Pela Paz," *Problemas*, Rio de Janeiro, November-December 1952.

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The anti-US campaign flowered in 1953 in a Conference for National Liberation which, according to Prestes, "was supported by many prominent public figures, higher-ranking officers and generals, as well as by patriotic citizens of the most diverse trends and social status."[19] This conference established a Legion for National Emancipation in which, according to one Communist leader, "the Communists are active but which is not organically connected with the Communists."[20]

Communists Efforts Among Workers and Peasants

WHILE wooing the support of the generals, the admirals, the intellectuals and businessmen by appeals based on nationalism, the Communists at no time lost sight of the fact that their main potential source of strength comprised the workers and peasants, with their more down-to-earth interests. Apropos the role of this group in the Brazilian Communists' scheme of things, Arruda wrote:

The Democratic Front of National Liberation only can have organic consistency and be effectively an instrument in the struggle against imperialism and for national independence if it rests fundamentally on the alliance of the working class with the wide peasant masses, particularly with the semiproletarians of the countryside, the peasants without land and the small peasants.[21]

In the labor field, the Communists continued to be active and influential, although they had lost much popular support among the workers since the party's legal heyday.[22] Among the workers the Communists urged strong trade union action to redress grievances, and whenever possible they led strikes, such as the maritime walkout in 1953. The fact that they had lost considerable ground among the trade unionists was shown by their inability to gain control of the nearly general strike in Sao Paulo in May, 1953.[23]

Nevertheless, the Communists and the followers of Getulio Vargas continued to be the two principal political elements among the workers. The Communists zigged and zagged in their attitude toward Vargas. During his 1950 election campaign when he seemed to take a position of relative hostility toward the United States, the Communists put up no candidate. This, in view of their violent attacks on the Dutra Government, meant virtually that they left their followers free to vote for Vargas.

However, when Vargas, after his election, said that he was not an enemy of the United States, and agreed to participate in the 1951 Conference of American Foreign Ministers, the Communists turned violently against him. An example of their attitude was shown by an article of João Amazonas in the middle of 1951, which referred to "The Government of Vargas—Government of war, of colonization, of famine and oppression." Amazonas elaborated on this by saying: "The imperialists demand the total surrender of our natural riches, and the government of Vargas is carrying out these demands of the Yankees."[24]

With the growing economic crisis, the Communists once more attempted to court Vargas' followers, while continuing to attack Vargas personally. When the more extreme wing of Vargas' Labor Party controlled the Ministry of Labor in 1953–54, the Communists worked closely with this group. This wing of the Vargasites supported the maritime strike of June 1953, which was largely led by the Communists.[25]

In line with this courtship of the Vargas elements, the 1954 May Day Proclamation of the Communist Party had only one disparaging reference to the Vargas government. By that time the alliance between the leftwing Vargasites and the Communists was more or less official. This was admitted to the writer by one of the principal Communist leaders in July 1954, who explained that although the Communists did not trust the radical Vargasites, the interests of the two groups were parallel. The Communists,

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[19] Luiz Carlos Prestes, "The Brazilian People Resist US Domination," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, Bucharest, March 25, 1955.

[20] Interview with Maria da Graca, member of editorial board of *Imprensa Popular*, and leading "legal" figure in Brazilian Communist Party, in Rio de Janeiro, July 3, 1954.

[21] Arruda, *op, cit.*

[22] Visible evidence of the decline in popular support was shown in the 1953 municipal election in São Paulo. The candidate for mayor backed by the Communists received some 20,000 votes, compared with well over 100,000 polled by the CP in 1947. (Interview with Plinio Mello, member National Committee of Socialist Party, in São Paulo, June 16, 1953.)

[23] Interview with Remo Forli, President of Metallurgical Workers Union of São Paulo in São Paulo, June 16, 1953. This strike, which was the biggest event of its kind so far in the 1950's, was largely led by Socialists and independent elements. The Communists were only one of several political groups represented in the strike committee, and most of the unions which participated in the walkout were not Communist-led. Their failure to exploit this strike, combined with their miserable showing in the 1953 mayoralty elections, which we have already noted, showed that the Communists had lost ground drastically in the country's principal industrial city, where in 1945 they had polled more votes than any other party, and in 1947 had provided the margin of victory for the successful candidate for governor of the State. The fall in Communist support was more dramatic in Sao Paulo than elsewhere, but on a somewhat lesser scale could be matched in other important urban centers.

[24] Amazonas, *op. cit.*

[25] Interview with João Bautista Almeida, President of Federacao Maritima Nacional, in Rio de Janeiro, June 20, 1953.

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banned as a political party, sought some means to name their own people as candidates in the congressional elections of October 1954. The Vargas Labor Party was anxious to get the support of the Communist voters. Hence, the two groups were cooperating.[26]

With the suicide of Vargas in August 1954, after he had written letters which hinted vaguely at "foreign influence" which prevented him from helping the workers of Brazil, the Communists wrote off past grievances and attempted to take over the leadership of the Vargas followers and turn them into the channel of anti-Yankeeism.

Paralleling their efforts in the labor field, during this period, the Communists put particular stress on organization work among the peasants. Concrete evidence of this work of the Communists was the so-called Second National Conference of Farm Workers and Peasants, held in São Paulo in 1954. Out of this emerged for the first time in Brazil a national peasants' organization, the Union of Farmers and Farm Workers of Brazil. Further, in their eagerness to enlist the support of the peasants the Communists did an about-face in their attitude toward well-to-do peasants. Arruda, writing for the Cominform journal about the program adopted by the Brazilian Communist Party at its fourth congress, early in 1955, explained:

The program corrects a whole number of mistakes we made in relation to the middle and rich peasant. Due to the influence of the August 1950 manifesto of the party, sectarian views were current in our ranks to the effect that rich and even middle peasants represented a counter-revolutionary force and that their land ought to be confiscated by a people's-democratic state. By guaranteeing the property of the well-to-do peasants, the program takes into account objective economic reality. Thus we win the well-to-do peasants to the side of the proletariat and increase the possibilities of winning over the middle peasants.[27]

Revolutionary Perspectives of Brazilian CP

THIS statement by Arruda underscores the tactical nature of the various shifts in emphasis by the Communist Party since its adoption of a "revolutionary nationalist" line in 1949. It confirms that work among the peasants, in particular, has had as its principal objective not the welfare of the peasants, but winning them to support the Communists in their attempts—military if necessary—to form a "people's democratic" government in Brazil.

That the Brazilian Communists since 1949 had been seriously planning military action against the government *if that should prove propitious* is demonstrated by the statements of the Communist leaders. As early as April 1951 Arruda wrote that the Party must use "all forms of mass struggle." He said:

It is certain that at the present time the principal form of struggle is the struggle of the masses—protests, demonstrations, economic and political strikes—which, especially in the countryside, tend to become rapidly transformed into partial combats, in armed struggles for concrete objectives.

Asserting that the party "must in no way fear" this development, he quoted Prestes as saying:

We must learn to use all the forms of struggle which the tense international situation requires. Since we are at the front of the masses, we must not recoil from using the highest forms of struggle, including violent shocks with the forces of reaction, partial combats to which we will sometimes be forced, especially in the interior of the country, in the struggle of the masses against feudalism and police brutality. Situations may arise, too, in which local or regional power weakens. In such cases, we must never vacillate in taking power, to realize within that locality our agrarian and anti-imperialist program, which will then become known to the masses, even though our stay in power may be brief. In addition, as international contradictions arise as a result of violent conflicts between various factions of the ruling classes, we must intervene as an independent force in these conflicts, as best we may, supporting, as the circumstances dictate, one side or the other, always seeking to transfer these combats into mass struggles for national independence, against imperialism, for liberty and democracy, for land for the peasants, for better wages and working conditions for the proletariat, for a popular democratic and progressive government.[28]

While openly plotting the way for their seizure of power through exploitation of the grievances of various elements among workers and peasants, the Communists, as we have seen, put out their snares to capture support from groups potentially hostile to them. The vociferous nationalist campaign, with its stress on the purported attempt of the United States to thwart Brazilian economic development and convert the country into a "colony" serves this purpose. The party strives to rally middle class groups, whose economic and social interests are menaced by the Communists' call to revolution, to the support of Communist-controlled organizations, Communist-sponsored propaganda campaigns, and eventually, if possible, to support of the Communists themselves as the "only true Brazilian patriots." Though these elements are not receptive to the idea of a Communist-led revolution, they are willing to cooperate in campaigns against what they conceive

[26] Maria da Graca interview, *op cit.*

[27] Diogenes Arruda, "Program of the Communist Party of Brazil—Banner of Struggle for Freedom and Independence of the Brazilian People," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democarcy*, Bucharest, February 25, 1955.

[28] Diogenes Arruda, "Nosso Partido, Nossa Tatica, Nossas Tarefas Atuais," *Problemas*, Rio de Janeiro, March–April 1951.

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to be injurious to Brazilian nationalist feelings. They are thus at least neutralized; and, in extreme instances, important individuals—particularly among active and retired military men—may actually be won over to outright support of the Communist Party.

At the same time, the Communists have been aware of the possibility of arousing the enmity of these middle class groups, particularly the wealthier peasants and large elements of the industrial and commercial middle classes. Hence, in discussing the party program drawn up at the Fourth Congress of the PCB, Prestes wrote:

At the present time, in the interests of the victory of the Brazilian revolution, it is important that the peasants should, during their struggle, realize the necessity of revolutionary abolition of the present regime of the latifundists and big capitalists. That is why the party program does not include the demand for the nationalization of the land, but takes into account the clearly expressed will of the peasant masses who in our country demand, above all, the transfer of land to private ownership. The program correctly reflects all the progressive demands of the peasantry. It defends firmly the interests of the entire peasantry, including the rich peasants, whose property must on no account be identified with the property of latifundists and must be guaranteed against any kind of encroachment.
In these circumstances the peasant masses, comprising the majority of the population of the country, all peasantry—agricultural workers, poor, middle, and even rich peasants—may be won over to the side of the proletariat and must become its main ally. The alliance of the working class with the entire peasantry is possible and essential.

Regarding the necessity of winning over sizable segments of the middle classes, however, Prestes added:

The party program not only does not threaten the interests of the national bourgeoisie, but upholds those of its demands that are progressive in character, in particular the demand for developing the national industry.
It would be a mistake, one which could weaken the anti-imperialist, antifeudal forces, to confuse the national bourgeoisie with the forces of the feudal and imperialist camp and underrate the significance of this bourgeoisie, particularly in the present stage of the revolutionary movement in Brazil, owing to its influence on the petty bourgeoisie, the peasant masses, and even on part of the workers. This attitude would lead to sectarianism and to isolation of the Communists from the broad popular masses, whereas the victory of the revolution demands that these masses be won over for the proletariatand wrested from the influence of the national bourgeoisie and national reformism.[29]

Prestes ends this part of the discussion by saying in a fashion which showed clearly the Party's joint objectives—anti-Yankeeism and the eventual Communist seizure of power—the following:

Today our aim is to abolish the regime of exploitation and oppression which serves the interests of the North American imperialists and replace it by a new people's democratic regime.

The objective of the Brazilian Communists—to form in Brazil a "popular democratic" government modeled after those in Eastern Europe—was emphasized in the party program adopted at the Fourth Congress. Arruda, commenting on this aspect of the program, says:

The system that would be capable of carrying out the radical changes outlined in the party program is the people's democratic one. The people's democratic system will possess, in the form of a democratic government of national liberation, the means of implementing its day-to-day policy.[30]

Prestes, writing for the Cominform journal, makes clear the model which the Brazilian Communits are following in proposing the establishment of a "people's democracy." He says:

The Brazilian Communist Party takes the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as its example and model, and, on the basis of its lessons and experiences, adduces the struggle of the workers.

In the last paragraph of this article Prestes reveals what the Brazilian Communists really have in mind for the future of Brazil, notwithstanding their talk about "fighting for the workers," seeking "the division of the land," and "protecting the rights of national capitalists"—high-sounding talk with which the party attempts to cloak its real objectives from those who might actively oppose the Communists if their real intentions were public knowledge. Prestes says:

With the further consolidation of the Communist Party, the struggle of the Brazilian people will steadily acquire greater force and follow the line of creating a democratic national liberation front and setting up a new government. Conditions are fast ripening which will make possible and necessary a people's democratic revolution and the carrying into life of the program of the Communist Party of Brazil.[31]

Conclusion

THUS the Communists have blueprinted their intention to establish in Brazil at the earliest possible moment a "people's democracy" such as Moscow established in Eastern European countries

[29] Luiz Carlos Prestes, "Communist Party of Brazil in Struggle for Peace, Freedom, and Independence of Homeland," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, Bucharest, Rumania, January 21, 1955.

[30] Diogenes Arruda, "Program of the Communist Party of Brazil—Banner of Struggle for Freedom and Independence of the Brazilian People," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, Bucharest, Rumania, February 25, 1955.

[31] Luiz Carlos Prestes, "The Brazilian People Resist US Domination," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, Bucharest, March 25, 1955.

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after World War II, and such as now exists in Communist China. Such a regime would consist in the beginning of a coalition of parties and groups from labor and the middle class, united insofar as possible on a pseudonationalist and social reform program, but "led by the working class and its Communist Party." In other words, such a "people's democracy" would be dominated by the Communist Party and would be merely a step in the Communists' drive for complete power, since, as Prestes says, the Brazilian Communist Party takes "as its example and model" the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Thus the Brazilian Communists have followed undeviatingly the policies of the Soviet Union. After World War II, but before the development of high tension between the USSR and the Western Powers, the Brazilian Communists sought to build a mass party by appearing as champions of the interests particularly of the industrial workers, and presenting a cooperative attitude to the government. With the onset of the cold war in earnest, they completely altered their former policy, concentrating their propaganda and activity on a campaign of verbal violence against the United States in the interests of the Soviet Union, and of preparation of the ground for a party-led revolution—violent if necessary—for the purpose of establishing a typically Communist "people's democracy."

In the last half of 1955 there is no indication that the Brazilian Communists have swerved from the program and policies which they have been following for more than half a dozen years.

Lenin on Communist Tactics in Underdeveloped Areas

In regard to more backward states and nations in which feudal or patriarchal, or patriarchal-peasant relations predominate, it is particularly important to bear in mind:

First, that all the Communist Parties must assist the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement in these countries, and that the primary duty of rendering the most active assistance rests upon the workers in these countries upon which the backward nation is dependent as a colony or financially;

Second, that it is necessary to fight against the clergy and other influential reactionary and medieval elements in backward countries;

Third, that is necessary to combat Pan-Islamism and similar trends, which strive to combine the liberation movement against European and American imperialism with the strengthening of the positions of the khans, the landlords, the mullahs, etc.;

Fourth, that is necessary to render special assistance to the peasant movement in the backward countries against the landlords, against large landownership, against all manifestations or survivals of feudalism; to strive to give the peasant movement the most revolutionary character and to establish the closest possible alliance between the West European Communist proletariat and the revolutionary peasant movement in the East, in the colonies and in the backward countries, generally;

Fifth, that it is necessary to wage a determined struggle against painting the bourgeois-democratic liberation trend in backward countries in Communist colors; the Communist International must support the bourgeois-democratic national movements in colonial and backward countries only on condition that the elements of future proletariat parties existing in all backward countries, which are not merely Communist in name, shall be grouped together and trained to appreciate their special tasks, viz, the tasks of fighting the bourgeois-democratic movements within their own nations; the Communist International must enter into a temporary alliance with the bourgeois democracy in colonial and backward countries, but must not merge with it, and must unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement in its most rudimentary form;

Sixth, that is is necessary steadily to explain to and expose among the broadest masses of the toilers of all countries, and particularly of backward countries, the deception which the imperialist powers systematically practice by creating, in the guise of politically independent states, states which are absolutely dependent upon them economically, financially and militarily; in the present international situation there is no salvation for dependent and weak nations except in a union of Soviet republics.

—Lenin: "Preliminary Draft of Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" (June 1920), reprinted in *V. I. Lenin, Selected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 231.

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Democracy vs. Communism in the Philippines

By Alvin H. Scaff

Editors' Note: The following excerpts are taken from Prof. Alvin H. Scaff's recently published book *The Philippine Answer to Communism* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1955). Based on a thorough study of all available materials, as well as on interviews with numerous people, the book offers a fascinating account of an indigenous Communist revolt, and the successful efforts of the Philippine government to suppress it and lead the country out of chaos onto a path of democratic reconstruction and prosperity. The revolt was organized by the Communist armed force known as the Huks, an abbreviated form of the longer word Hukbalahap (Hukbond Bayan Laban Sa Hapon), or People's Army Against the Japanese. Originally a guerrilla unit fighting the Japanese invaders, the Huks—after a brief and abortive attempt to gain control through political means—launched a civil war against the Philippine authorities in 1946. At that time they also changed their name to People's Liberation Army (Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, or HMB), but the term Huk remained in common usage.

After several years of bitter struggle, the government took a step which—within four years—brought the war to a virtual standstill. In 1950, it established the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), a special branch of the armed forces charged with the following functions:

"a. The taking over of surrendered or captured dissidents, who are neither indicted nor convicted by civil courts, for the purpose of resettlement and reeducating them in democratic, peaceful and productive ways of life.

b. The resettlement of selected ex-servicemen, ex-guerrillas, and ex-trainees, and other selected Philippine citizens, in EDCOR Farms as a means of utilizing them as a stabilizing influence in the reeducation and reformation of ex-dissidents taken over by EDCOR as settlers.

c. The training of surrendered or captured dissidents in the various trades and occupations for the purpose of enabling them to pursue gainful occupations." (Armed Forces of the Philippines, *Troop Information*, Pamphlet No. 21, p. 3).

The formation of EDCOR marked a new phase in the battle against communism. It signified the government's conviction that the Philippine peasants, who comprised the backbone of the Huks, had rightful claims to the land they had tilled; and that the exploitation by and influence of the Communists could only be undercut by a combination of economic and social reforms, education, and—if need be—force. The first section below, taken from the final chapter of Dr. Scaff's study, summarizes the methods used, and the results that have been achieved thus far. "The Struggle for the Minds of Men," which constitutes Chapter X, analyzes the reasons that impelled many Filipinos first to join the Huks, and then to abandon them. They should be of interest in all underdeveloped areas where Communists present a real or potential military threat.

From Chaos to Victory

THE success of the government's actions against the Huks can be dated from the capture of the Politburo on October 18, 1950. In reviewing the experience of the last four years, several important aspects of the successful campaign stand out: first, a vigorous and effective military action; second, the winning of the people to the government's side; third, an exposé of Communist ideas and the propagation of democratic principles; and fourth, attrition against the hard core of communism.

Mr. Scaff lived in the Philippines between 1940 and 1945; he returned in 1953, as a Fulbright Fellow, for a year's study of the Huk rebellion.

An essential prerequisite to the success of the campaign has been a group of capable national leaders devoted to the democratic way of life. These leaders have learned that military force alone could not suppress the Huk movement. A campaign of verbal propaganda for democracy by itself was not enough. Land reform alone, even according to Communist Politburo members, would not stop the armed rebellion. Success against the Huks could result only from a simultaneous attack on many fronts.

Military action became effective especially when it was combined with measures to improve public support. As long as the army was party to occasional

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acts of violence against the people in Huklandia, the civilians remained taciturn and hostile. However, a friendly army which gave the civilians protection against Huk raids and foraging parties won the respect of the people. The government learned that if its army provided peace and order both day and night it could retain the loyalty of the residents. The communication of pro-government sympathies in the war of ideas was most effective in the areas where the army had provided security for the people. Thus, the propaganda struggle went hand in hand with the military action.

As the Huks became fewer, more disorganized and discouraged, they held their fire and passed up opportunities to ambush army patrols. Sensitive army men were quick to note this situation. By May of 1954 the patrols were firing at the Huks only as a last resort. There were instances in the Central Luzon area where soldiers had chased down the fleeing Huks in open fields. The avoidance of useless bloodshed increased the popularity of the army throughout the area. It must be remembered that every Huk had numerous relatives among the civilian population. No matter what the cause, the killing of one's countrymen was not popular.

For too many years the government had been set apart from the common people in the farm lands of Central Luzon. Before the war, government positions were held by representatives of the landlord class, and their offices were conducted largely in behalf of that group. The peasants lived to themselves and nursed their grievances in secret meetings of their own organizations. During the Japanese occupation the Philippine government offered them no protection. At the end of the war the peasants felt no obligation to support the government nor to be loyal to it in the struggle with the Huks.

In this situation it took something more than a barrage of verbal propaganda to win the people. They wanted more than promises; they wanted tangible evidence that the government was on the side of justice and would act in the interest of the people's welfare. The improved record of the government in recent years has greatly strengthened the campaign against the Huks. For example, the Rice Share Tenancy Act, which for years had not been put into effect, recently has become the basis of settling tenant complaints through the Industrial Relations Courts. As the tenants become aware of the existence of this legal process of settling issues, increasing numbers of cases are brought to court. A new appreciation of law has developed among the common people. This is basic to a sound democracy. The EDCOR resettlement program, though far from a complete solution to the problems of landless farmers and peasant poverty, has been an important demonstration of the government's desire to help the people. In the face of these sincere efforts, individuals who had been sympathetic with the Huks or on the verge of casting their lot with the revolutionaries began to reconsider. Perhaps after all a government with a genuine humanitarian concern for the people was worth supporting.

The clean elections of 1951 and 1953 were major factors in winning the people to the side of democratic government. The chicanery during the 1949 election had created enough disaffection for the Communist Party to declare that a revolutionary situation existed and that it was moving toward a revolutionary crisis, making possible the overthrow of the government by November 7, 1951. The party plans and the target date for the revolution were revealed in Politburo documents captured in 1950.[1]

The new Magsaysay administration, which was elected by an unprecedented majority in 1953, has started a vigorous program of national development. Beginning with the barrios where the majority of the people live, the program includes new roads, more sanitary wells, additional schools, antimalarial drives in the areas where this is a problem, financial aid to small farmers through agricultural credit cooperatives and assistance in improved farming through agricultural extension services. In addition to the EDCOR farms, a greatly increased program of land settlement for thousands of land-hungry citizens is under way. The careful study and improvement of the services of many government bureaus will bring increased efficiency and confidence. The Philippine Congress has recently approved a billion-peso bond issue to finance basic industrial development. This is part of a long-range program to give the nation a more balanced economy and to solve the problem of unemployment. The people take pride in the government which they put into office, and they have responded enthusiastically to the launching of these measures.

While engrossed in the conduct of government affairs, the Philippines has not overlooked the ideological challenge presented by communism. Communism spreads not only among workers and peasants who bear the brunt of social and economic maladjustments; it also spreads among the leaders of society: the lawyers, teachers, doctors, and intellectuals to whom ideas are important.

[1] José M. Crisol, "Communist Propaganda in the Philippines, 1950–1953," *Philippine Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3–4, December 1953, p. 209.

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Democracy has an intellectual and moral advantage which it can ill afford to lose. The plausible intricacies of Marxist dialectics are more than matched with the realistic and demonstrable truths of democratic life. The people of any nation will respond to the challenge of an ideal, a cause, a mission. Every generation must be taught that democracy not only means a good life on a high level of living but primarily is a life of freedom in a land of opportunity, where merit is rewarded, where man is not penalized for believing in God, and where all the important decisions are not dictated by a handful of men in control of a political party. This is the challenge of democracy. This is what the Philippine people are fighting for; this is what the United Nations fought for in Korea. Sometimes the fight must be carried on with guns and bullets, but much of the struggle must be fought with words and ideas that contrast the stark oppression of Communist control in all its inhumanity with the picture of free democratic life in all its possibilities.

THE experience of the Philippines shows that steady progress against the Huks depended upon a thorough understanding of communism. The campaign could never be waged simply as a military field operation; it was always at the same time a battle of ideas. Government leaders had to know what communism is and how it works. The Huks could not be treated as local national dissidents; they had connections with the Communists elsewhere and reacted locally according to the international party line. Negotiations for truce, amnesty, or surrender ran into the same kind of stalling and double talk that became so infuriating at Panmunjon. In the Philippines the government leaders finally learned that negotiations for surrender are always used by the Huks for their own ulterior purposes. A genuine surrender is an impossibility, for surrender is interpreted by the Communists as admitting that the party is illegal. An individual Communist may leave the party or be expelled, but as long as he is a party member he must remain a revolutionary. The ultimate objective is the overthrow of the government, in which the party assumes that armed force is necessary. William Pomeroy, the American Communist who joined the Huks, explained that he did so because he wished to work in a situation where the revolution was more advanced than it was at home.

Communism can never be judged solely on the basis of what its leaders are saying and doing at the moment; it can only be judged in terms of its ultimate objectives. At any given point of time the party line might be "peace and cooperation." Such tactics are for purposes of preserving the movement and advancing to the next stage. Or, they may be designed to confuse the opposition. To pin a Communist down to a definite program is as difficult as striking the head of a twisting serpent.

Through years of experience in fighting the Communist aggression the administration leaders have reached a mature understanding of the nature of the opposing movement. Keenly aware of the slippery nature of Communist tactics, Major General Jesus Vargas, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, warned a Manila audience in a recent address:

> We would be far from wise if we thought, as many would like to think today, that our Communist problem here had ended with the surrender of Taruc or will end with the capture, death, or surrender of the other Communist leaders. Communists are Communists. They have a way of shifting with ease from surface activities to underground movement, depending on the exigencies of the situation they are in. There is such a thing as a bloodless revolution, and that exactly is what the Communists always pull on innocent democracies whenever they are not in a position to overthrow an enemy government militarily. With the return of the Communist leaders to peace, that kind of revolution is what they will seek to wage. They will seek to associate with worthy causes. They will adopt misleading party names and alliances. They will maintain the "hard core" of membership. They will enhance hatred and promote strikes and violence. They will resort to sabotage. They will seek to divide us. Above all, they will infiltrate into the government, universities, civic organizations, even churches. That is the usual Communist pattern. With the Communist leaders back with us and the masses, that is the problem we are up against.

Without such understanding of communism the victory which has been gained in the armed struggle might be largely lost through the infiltration tactics of "surrenderees" whose real party assignment was the "legal struggle."

The hard-core Communists who are deeply indoctrinated with the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist-Mao theory are at least amenable to pro-democratic ideas in the form of persuasion or literature. They may, however, be isolated from their following. The government has had its greatest success in winning the mass base away from the Huks and in the rehabilitation of the common Huk soldiers and Huk commanders, who largely compose the settlers in the EDCOR farms. The loss of their mass support places the inner core of Communist leaders under great pressure. They begin to question party policies and to quarrel among themselves. In the face of failure some break away and renounce communism, and others may be expelled as a matter of party discipline. This has happened in the Communist Party of the

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Philippines in the past; present rumblings indicate that it may happen again.

This indirect approach to communism, by winning the people away from their Communist leaders and leaving the hard core isolated and hard pressed, has been the genius of the Philippine program. A democratic appeal to the people can be effective. Moreover, the appeal carries greatest force when it is rooted in the experience of the people with representative government in democratic communities and is not limited to lectures and leaflets. EDCOR was effective in the anti-Huk campaign not just because it was an idea that undercut the Huk promises of "land for the landless" but primarily because it was an actual program of land settlement where democratic communities flourished. An experience in democracy is the real weapon against communism.

The lessons which the Philippines has learned in its struggle against communism have not come easily. They have been bathed in the blood and anguish of eight long years of civil strife since the end of World War II. But out of these struggles the government has developed an understanding of communism and has fashioned an effective program to strengthen its own democratic institutions. The Philippines has brought to the free world a victory and, more important, a way toward victory which may serve to aid and encourage other democracies that are locked in struggle with a Communist rebellion.

The Struggle for the Minds of Men

WHY did 100,000 Filipinos at one time become active members or sympathetic supporters of the Huks? What motives and processes led them into the movement? These questions can best be answered by examining a representative group of individuals who have been active Huks. The author was able to study intensively the experiences of 95 ex-Huks at EDCOR, who were selected at random so as to include the wide range from well-educated leaders to illiterate followers. This EDCOR group represents all the major types of experience among the Huks with the exception of the hard core of intellectual leaders, and probably gives a good picture of the relative importance of the different sources of motivation.

Well over half the ex-Huks had become members without being moved to any appreciable degree by ideas.[2] Only 14 cases were found where verbal persuasion, or propaganda, was the sole motivating force in their joining the revolution. Among these, 10 were interested chiefly in agrarian issues, such as land distribution and the abolition of usury, or equality and help for the oppressed. In another 26 cases, persuasion was a contributing influence in a complex of motives. For example, effective Communist teaching prepared Alfredo Cruz for membership in the Huks. In 1945 he joined a youth organization in his barrio, which Communists had heavily infiltrated. He already knew what it meant to be poor, but he learned in the youth organization about a "new democracy" which could be gained by fighting oppression. In order to stop exploitation, the poor must organize and fight for their rights. Believeing these ideas, Alfredo joined other youths in supplying food to the Huks. When they were discovered by the army he fled from his barrio and joined a fighting squadron in the mountains. Later he became chairman of a section organizing committee, where he had an opportunity to exercise his interest in ideas.

Vicente Cuevas represents those whose motives in joining the Huks were a mixture of propaganda and circumstances. A natural leader in his barrio, Vicente became the local contact man for the Huk field command in that area. He helped to arrange a Huk rally, which was attended by all the townspeople. In their enthusiasm they decided to form their own Huk unit, and Vicente became its head by popular decision. He could hardly refuse without arousing suspicion, and he could not afford to run away from his family and his tailoring business. Propelled into the movement by the sweep of these events, he then attended a Stalin university, where he took short intensive courses on Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Lincoln and Jefferson (carefully edited and selected), the state, military tactics, democracy (Soviet style), and revolution. He absorbed much of the Communist doctrine and became an advocate of the party propaganda. He believed that the present Philippine government was corrupt and should be changed, that land should be distributed to the peasants, and that usury should be abolished. One of the Communists' strongest points, he thought, was the fight for justice against the landlords. Following the doctrine that labor and not capital is the source of progress, Vicente advocated a larger share of profits for workers. Thoroughly involved in revolutionary activity, he

[2] Among the top Huk leaders now serving life prison sentences at the national prison at Muntinglupa, José Lava and William Pomeroy are notable examples of the minority who became Communists almost solely on the basis of an intellectual experience.

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was expecting a promotion in the Huk hierarchy when he was captured in March 1951.

In spite of the popular notion that the Huks are mostly bandits and social misfits, there is little evidence from a study of Huk personnel to support such opinion. On the contrary, the Huks maintain a strict moral code and have expelled some members and liquidated others for acts of crime.[3] The lawlessness of the Huks is of a political nature: crimes against the state, or acts of violence in the course of revolution. These may more easily excuse an individual Communist from a sense of personal guilt; nevertheless, they are more serious than ordinary lowclass burglary and murder. Likewise, there is little evidence that the Huk movement is an escape for persons with unsolved personal problems. In only four cases among those studied at EDCOR could the motive for joining the Huks be classified as personal, and in these few cases the difficulty could be accurately described as idleness, curiosity, or restlessness—hardly appropriate ills to be described as maladjustment. In the great majority of cases the motives were social; that is, they were appeals to companionship by close friends or relatives, or they were promises based on the mistreatment of the Japanese during the occupation, the malfunctioning of the government, the miscarriage of justice, or the abuses of a tenant system.

No single motive, not even the agrarian issue, accounts for more than a small minority of those who joined the Huks. If any group of Huks would be likely to count agrarian problems high among reasons for joining the revolution, it should be those at EDCOR, who were interested in land and who volunteered to come to Mindanao. Yet in only ten cases was the desire for land, or the plight of the poor tenant, or some similar phrasing of agrarian unrest solely responsible for their joining the Huks. For another eighteen individuals, agrarian complaints were an important item among a complex of several motives. Together these constitute only 29 percent of the ex-Huks at EDCOR. One is forced to realize that the agrarian issue is only one of a number of talking points for the Communists and that propaganda itself, though important, is not the chief means of adding new recruits. Once in the fold, a new member was often so impressed by the promises of land distribution that he stayed on as a loyal Huk. Even more important than its usefulness as a recruiting issue and as a subject of indoctrination, the agrarian problem is adroitly handled by the Communists to give the revolutionary conspiracy a righteous and high-sounding tone.

[3] The testimony to this effect in Taruc's biography (*Born of the People*, p. 129) was amply corroborated in the interviews of ex-Huks at EDCOR.

Loyalty——Enforced and Voluntary

HUK leaders have long realized that recruiting could not wait for the slow process of persuasion and free decision. Among ex-Huks interviewed at EDCOR, nineteen had been forced to join at the point of a gun or because of threats of violence against their families. In another twelve cases the use of force was an important element among several related factors. Thus, among the ex-Huks at EDCOR force had been used as a recruiting procedure in more instances than the appeal of agrarian reform.

The experience of young Felix Tanduay shows how pressure was applied to families to force individuals to join the Huks. During the expansion of the Huk activities on the island of Panay, Huk commander Capadocia ordered each of several barrios to send three bright, promising girls to the Stalin university, which had been established in the mountains. The leader of the Huks in Felix's home barrio picked the sister of Felix as one of the new recruits. The Tanduay family was deeply troubled. They dared not say no, because several people in nearby places had been killed for refusing to obey the Huk demands. While the family was debating what to do, Felix returned home from the town where he had been attending high school as a boarding student. When he saw his sister in tears and learned about the Huk order, he volunteered to go to the mountains in her place. Though it meant the interruption of his schooling, the family agreed to this substitute arrangement, since no other good alternative seemed available. In this manner the Huks obtained a youth who served their cause loyally, if not voluntarily, in order to protect his family.

Sometimes individuals joined the Huks to avoid further persecution or terrorism by the governmental forces. This was true of 19 percent of the ex-Huks at EDCOR. One might say that they were shoved into the arms of the revolutionaries by the very efforts of the army to suppress the armed revolt. For example, in 1946, during the effort to stamp out the dissident movement by force, Francisco Dalmar was captured by the civilian guards. Suspecting that he was a Huk, they beat him and kicked him but finally turned him loose when he refused to confess. Embittered and determined to seek revenge, he decided to join a Huk unit. Heading toward the mountains, he soon met a squadron commander, who inducted him into

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the organization. After two weeks under observation he received a gun and became an active Huk.

Sometimes soldiers who had been active guerrillas during the war joined the Huks in anger against the government for depriving them of their back pay. This was true of the experience of 8 percent of the ex-Huks at EDCOR. Many a loyal guerrilla fighter, for example, suffered the same disappointment as Antonio Sarangaya. During the period of the Japanese occupation he fought with a USAFFEE unit recognized by the United States Army. When the time came for mustering out after the fighting was over in 1945, all the men in his organization applied for back pay. One after another his companions received a fat check, but nothing came for Antonio. Finally one day an officer from the Finance Division approached him and suggested that for a certain "fee" he could arrange the back pay. When Sarangaya complained that he was broke, the officer tore up his application papers in his presence. In disgust and anger Antonio joined the Huks, "determined to die if necessary in order to clean up the government." The program of back pay to the veterans of the guerrilla campaigns, though well intentioned, damaged the reputation of the government because of its corrupt administration.

Among 8 percent of the ex-Huks at EDCOR the chief motive in joining the dissident cause was a sense of personal obligation to former friends. This strong bond is rooted in Philippine society and especially in the family, where it is almost impossible to say "no" to the request of a friend or relative. Strange as this may sound to Western man, who is accustomed to a more loosely knit social system, the feeling of obligation to accede to the request of a friend is a powerful motive in some Oriental societies. Communism makes use of this custom in recruiting followers; then, if the events of recent years in China are indicative, it ruthlessly destroys the familial bonds as a threat to the totalitarian state.

An interesting example of the power of this sense of obligation to friends is found in the experience of Nicanor Hernandez. He first joined the Huks early in the war in 1942 because he "believed in their cause." During the fighting for liberation in 1945 he contracted malaria and went home to recover. By the time he was well the war had ended. Believing that his days with the Huks were over, Hernandez married a neighborhood sweetheart and settled down to farming. But next year the Huks were reactivated and many of his former companions joined. Hernandez did not wish to leave his new wife and the peace of home. But his friends asked him to come, and he went with them. He explained, "I could not say no. I was one of them, and I felt that this was my obligation."

Ways and Methods of Joining the Movement

WHY they joined the Huks is inseparable from the process of how they joined, for motivation includes the entire complex of action in becoming a Huk and not simply the reasons which one may give for joining or the appealing aspects of the Huk propaganda. Becoming a Huk is a series of interlocking acts, one leading to another like links in a chain. Usually, first contact with the movement came through force, or accident, or friendly associations. Intellectual assent and indoctrination ordinarily followed later. This sequence was not invariable, but it was characteristic of the experience of most of the Huks studied.

Two examples from among the EDCOR settlers illustrate the order of events which gradually involved them in the Huk movement and finally led to a mental reorientation, or conversion to the "party line." Cecilio Lepanto, a young man, helped his father farm on a place far from town. One day the Huks passed his house and asked him to help carry supplies. The request was polite; and also, since the men were armed, he felt that he had to go. He was not reluctant, since some of the Huks had been his friends. Later, when they were in the mountains, the Huks told Lepanto that he had better stay with them because the Constabulary would learn that he had helped the Huks and would persecute him. In the days that followed the Huks explained their program. When the revolution succeeded, they said, Lepanto and other farmers would receive free land. Those now living in poverty would have jobs and privileges. He believed these promises and stayed in the mountains to become an active Huk. What began as an innocent association led finally to voluntary service undergirded by political conviction.

Victor Benedicto has a forceful personality and an education which elevates him above the man in the ranks. During the war he fought in a guerrilla band on Luzon, but in the political juggling afterward his outfit failed to receive recognition and back pay. He took a job as bus driver in Laguna Province. One day his bus was stopped by a Huk squadron, and Benedicto was kidnaped and taken to their camp. Although he was kept a captive, he was treated kindly and fed a constant diet of Huk propaganda. Recalling the experience, he said, "I was convinced of the good intentions of the Huks: their defiance of crooked government officials, their fight for justice,

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and their hard work. I was pleased with what I saw and heard, so I joined them." First he was captured, then he decided to join. Intellectual conviction is not less important because it comes after overt action, for the staunch doctrinal core of communism gives the revolution its staying power. Individuals may have drifted casually into the movement or may have been forced to join, but they remain and endure the rigors of guerrilla life because of a belief that only communism will bring about justice and equality and the good life to the masses.

Assuming that the initial link between an individual and the Huks is an important point in the life cycle of a revolutionary, the author asked the ex-Huks at EDCOR to tell about their first contact with the movement. Here are the results: the largest number, about 38 percent, became involved in the Huks through personal friendship. Some 20 percent were "invited" to join by armed strangers; while almost an equal number, some 18 percent, were kidnaped or captured. About 11 percent of the individuals sought out the Huks voluntarily. Smaller numbers entered the movement through feeder organizations, or through the influence of someone in authority, or upon the invitation of unarmed Huk organizers.

The Road to Freedom

AGAINST this background of varied motives, desires, interests, and experience on the part of the Huks, the government's efforts to recapture the loyalty of its wayward citizens can be better appreciated. Having traced the process whereby one becomes a Huk, what is the reverse pattern of restoring him to normal society and rehabilitating him for democratic citizenship? The Huks rely largely upon force to fill their requirements for new recruits; the army likewise uses force to recapture them. Force employed by both sides accounts for the largest single shift in manpower, but force alone can no more explain the strength of the government's appeal to the loyalty of its citizens than it can account for the popularity of the Huks among thousands of Filipinos. Clues to the subtler factors which incline men toward democratic government and away from communism come not from those Huks captured in military action but from those who escaped from their squadrons and surrendered voluntarily to the government.

Among the ex-Huks interviewed at the EDCOR farms were sixty who had surrendered. Each of them was asked to explain why and how this had happened. Often several factors were involved in any single surrender, as was true of motivation for joining the Huks. However, the reasons given for surrender fall neatly into four groups: first, the hardships of life in the mountains; second, the failures and disappointments of the Huk organization; third, opportunities offered by the government; and fourth, family pressures to surrender.

The life of the Huk guerrilla in the Philippines is more difficult in many respects than that of his brother Communist in China, North Korea, or Indo-China. The difference is largely one of geography. In those countries the Communists have been able to fight a territorial war and to defend land areas which could be developed as bases of operations. In the small and rugged island world of the Philippines such a territorial sanctuary for the Huks has never been possible. The army occupies the inhabited areas in the lowlands and periodically sends expeditions into the mountains to destroy Huk hideouts. This leaves the guerrillas only one recourse, a furtive and mobile existence. Some 61 percent of those who surrendered cited hardships in the mountains as the chief factor in their decision to give up. One after another they registered complaints against exposure to the cold, the lack of food, and the loss of sleep. Many of these difficulties resulted from the frequent attacks of the armed forces. After two to six years of guerrilla existence many of the ex-Huks said, "I was tired of a fugitive life; all I wanted was to live peacefully."

The next most important factor, which was cited by 45 percent of those who surrendered, was related to Huk failures. Some reacted to the strict Huk discipline and to the fact that they were forced to obey distasteful orders. They explained that the revolution was not progressing and would end in failure. Loss of hope in victory destroyed morale and led to discouragement and surrender. After months and months of effort and no returns, some of the Huks began to believe that the promises of their leaders were lies. In some instances the leader had surrendered with his men; in others, where the leader had been killed, the men decided to give up.

Some 23 percent of those surrendering were attracted to the government's side by various promises and opportunities. The one most often cited was the offer of free land, but almost as frequently mentioned was the promise that those who surrendered would not be tortured. Some were attracted by an offer of a job, a few by the practice of paying for surrendered firearms, and others by the generous policy of freeing those with no criminal charges against them.

Only twenty-seven out of the sixty surrendered Huks had heard of EDCOR before their decision to give themselves up.

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However, all but nine of those who had been informed about the new army program were wholly or partly influenced to surrender by it. The following statements indicate the impression made:

"News of EDCOR gave us hope for a new life."

"It greatly influenced my surrender, and I planned to volunteer to go to Mindanao."

Many said, "The promise of land and help by EDCOR was an important factor in my surrender."

"We decided to surrender only after we heard about EDCOR."

Several said, "I read the leaflets about EDCOR, which had been dropped by planes, and decided to surrender."

"I was already thinking about surrendering: EDCOR clinched my decision."

"When my parents and brother told me about EDCOR, I believed them and surrendered."

"We reasoned that life at EDCOR would be much better than fighting with the Huks; so we surrendered and applied to go to one of the settlements."

A small number, only 5 percent, had surrendered because of family pressures. This took several forms. In a few instances, during the period when the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, the armed forces held family members as hostages on charges of conniving with the Huks. More often, the relatives urged the individual in the Huks to surrender. Sometimes he was needed at home to earn a living for his family. These pressures would undoubtedly be more important were it not that most of the Huks are unmarried youths with little family responsibility.

The fact that surrendered or captured Huks move physically from one side to the other is important but does not necessarily mean that a corresponding mental reorientation has taken place. One who is tired of the hard, dreary life in the mountains may surrender but still believe that the Huks have the right ideas. Realizing this, the government has carried on a vast program of education for democracy. Among the population at large this has been the task of the public schools, the adult education programs, and special campaigns organized by the Civil Affairs officers. EDCOR has undertaken the more difficult job of reorienting the ex-Huks. This has been vastly different from "brain washing." The approach, itself democratic, has been to place the ex-Huks in a community of their own, but not isolated from the world around them, to give them maximum freedom and opportunity, and to encourage them to develop into responsible and loyal citizens. How successful this has been may be seen from the settlers' own responses to the program.

Reactions to EDCOR

WHAT do settlers like most about the EDCOR farms in Mindanao? What has impressed them most and influenced them to become pro-government in their sympathies? In his interviews with the settlers the author asked these questions: What do you think of life at EDCOR? Have you written letters to your family or friends? What did you tell them about EDCOR? Do you have any complaints or problems? What are your plans for the future?[4] The answers to these questions revealed in all but six cases one or more points of positive and favorable response to the life at the farms.

As would be expected, the largest number of settlers, about 58 percent, were impressed by government aid in the form of housing, a home lot, a ration of food, and farm equipment. Almost as large a number, some 51 percent, mentioned the free land. When asked what they thought of life at EDCOR, the settlers' faces would light up as they replied, "Here we have land!" One of them wrote in a letter to his brother, "I have a good farm lot. The children are growing stout here and are not sickly as they were in Manila." The brother replied, "You are better off than I am, because you have a piece of land." One whose face was permanently wrinkled by the hardships and worry during his years with the Huks said, "I am luckier than one who wins first prize in the sweepstakes, because here I have land that cannot be stolen. I could never own land in Luzon. I am comfortably settled in the most peaceful place in Mindanao, and I want to stay here a lifetime."

As many as 41 percent of the settlers were impressed by the fact that it was peaceful at EDCOR. Taken for granted by the ordinary citizen, peace became the pearl of great price to these Huks who had not possessed it in many years. The people in Huklandia had lived so long in the shadow of war that they turned in gratitude to the government which provided the basic

[4] A schedule of questions was used in the interviewing. Each question was asked as it was written. When the individual did not understand English, a written translation of the questions in his dialect was used instead. Often the original question obtained only a partial response. In these instances the question was repeated, or a similar question was asked, or follow-up questions were used until the author was satisfied that he had obtained the best and most complete answer possible on the subject covered by the question. In dialect interviews the author used interpreters. At Buldon the interpreter was an ex-Huk EDCOR settler who had been elected secretary of the town council. At Kapatagan the interpreter was not an ex-Huk but was a native of Central Luzon and the president of an important labor union. These interpreters helped immensely in establishing confidence during the interview and in securing free, honest answers.

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conditions for a happy life. The turbulent experience of Carlos Barbero is typical of many others. He joined the Huks in 1942 during the early days of the Japanese occupation. At the end of fighting in 1945, Carlos went home to his farm, but in a few months he was called back to his Huk unit by his former companions. Next year during the discussion of amnesty he slipped quietly back to his farm, where he led an uncertain civilian existence until 1951. In that year a Huk raid in a nearby barrio led to a Constabulary roundup of all suspects in the area. Carlos Barbero was among them. While in the stockade, he was beaten and punished severely. To him EDCOR was at first a welcome relief from prison. Once he was settled at the farm, it became an answer to his dreams. He said, "I like it here very much. It is peaceful. If one works hard, there is plenty of food. The past is over, and I will forget it. EDCOR is a wise program which is helping poor people. The great advantage here is the peaceful condition."

Some of the ex-Huks look back upon their life in Luzon as a nightmare. One expressed the idea simply: "I prefer it here to Luzon because it is safer. We only have the Moros to deal with here. On Luzon, former companions in the Huks will shoot you; and if they don't, enemies in the civil guard will." Another, who had escaped from his Huk squadron in order to surrender, said, "There is a future here. It is peaceful. I would not dare return to my native province in Luzon."

Some 35 percent of the settlers were impressed by the opportunities at the EDCOR farms. Their comments ran like this one: "Life here is excellent compared with that on Luzon. The land is very rich. With work and proper care it yields a big harvest. We have a chance to become prosperous. I am free. What I put into my land is mine." Sometimes, in the settler's enthusiasm he exaggerated the truth. One wrote to his father and mother, "The situation here is very good; one can easily get rich." One could not really get rich on an eight-hectare farm, but the sudden gift of opportunities to those who had never had any was enough to excite the imagination.

In 24 percent of those interviewed, the good treatment by the army and the pleasant conditions of life influenced the settlers in developing pro-government attitudes. For example, Juan Cunanan, who was a member of a peasant organization, the PKM, and who gave occasional aid to the Huks, was picked up by the army in 1951 and charged as a Huk agent. When he refused to confess, he was beaten and hit with the butt of a gun. He came to EDCOR with bitterness in his heart toward the armed forces. Two years later he said, "I like it here. I have forgotten all the harm done because of the good treatment. I have only brotherly love toward the people here."

Domingo Alvarez was captured in 1951. For years he had fought with a guerrilla unit, believing that "loyalty to country meant loyalty to the Huks." After his first year at EDCOR he wrote to his father about the "good treatment by the government and his house and the lot and farm." In reply the father wrote, "I know this cannot be true, but behave in the stockade where you are so that you will not be punished." Domingo had to send his parents a picture of himself and his family in front of their house in order to convince them that EDCOR was real. A year of good treatment was enough to change Domingo from his former allegiance to the Huks.

To many, the good treatment at EDCOR was related to free public schools for the children, medical care, and the opportunity for settlers to take a hand in their own affairs. One settler said, "I would not return to Luzon for a thousand pesos; I would not even go on a visit. We have a real democracy in living here." An ex-Huk, who had spent four months in confinement before coming to EDCOR, said, "This is a place where democracy is practiced in full swing. The government gives material aid to every settler and encourages them in their work by giving them every opportunity to make good and start life anew."

The EDCOR program is actually restoring faith in the government among men who have been active Communists. And though the effort involves only a few hundred individuals, the record is impressive. The government has not been slow to use this experience in the larger struggle for the minds of men. One issue of *Troop Information*, an armed forces mimeographed pamphlet for troop education, was devoted entirely to EDCOR. All soldiers were urged to study what the army was doing to rehabilitate ex-Huks and be able to explain the project to any who might inquire. Civil Affairs officers distributed picture posters and bulletins on EDCOR in all towns and barrios of the land. Army planes dropped EDCOR leaflets over Huk-infested areas. The publicity about EDCOR received major support when a Philippine movie company, LVN, turned out a well-produced film in the Tagalog dialect entitled "Huk," which featured the life of the former dissidents at EDCOR.

All of this publicity had a double purpose: It was beamed toward the Huks in hopes that an increasing number of them would surrender; and it was directed to the wider public in the perennial effort to build confidence in democracy. The results are clear. The

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old army of persecution became "the army with a social conscience"; the government of the landed aristocracy became the government concerned with the welfare of the people; and the man who fathered EDCOR, Ramon Magsaysay, became the next president of the Republic of the Philippines.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Recent Studies on Communism in Underdeveloped Areas

SOUTH AMERICA

El Comunismo en Iberoamerica (Communism in Latin America), ***Estudios Sobre el Comunismo,*** Santiago de Chile, April–June, 1955.

In view of the marked scarcity of serious studies on the activities of international communism in Latin America, it is noteworthy that *Estudios Sobre el Comunismo*, a quarterly published in Chile, devotes an entire section in each issue to this important subject. The current number features an introductory analysis of communism in Latin America, plus articles on Communist activities in Argentina, Bolivia, and British Guiana.

"An Introduction to the History of Communism in Latin America" is a competent and thoughtful exposition by Victor Alba, well-known Spanish political writer now residing in Mexico. Mr. Alba traces the origins of communism on the continent to various small radical movements which sprang up around the turn of the century. Among the important impeti to the development of radical, and later on, Communist parties, the author lists the struggle against imperialist domination, especially in the economic sphere, the Russian revolution and the Mexican revolution. He attributes particular importance to the Mexican revolution, since it was a primarily agrarian revolutionary movement in a country whose backward economic structure resembled that of many other countries on the South American continent.

Organized Communist parties emerged in the 1920's. The Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 set forth the theses on the basis of which most of the parties were subsequently established. These included: (1) a break with existing socialist movements; (2) struggle against "reformism and centralism" both inside and outside the party; (3) the fomenting of civil strife; and (4) the establishment on a parallel basis of a legal and an underground party apparatus. Among the first CP's in Latin America were those of Argentina (1921), Brazil (1921), and Chile (1922). As in many other areas of the world, the parties consisted principally of middle class elements and intellectuals, but failed to attract the working class.

While Mr. Alba deals primarily with early communism in Latin America, he injects a number of cogent comments concerning its present and future appeal. He believes that in order to achieve any success, Latin American communism must offer a solution to the two major problems facing the region: (1) the backward system of land ownership, and (2) backward policies which hamper economic development. So far communism's stock answers to these problems have been unsuccessful in attracting a mass following. Moreover, the class composition of South America has proven to be a powerful obstacle to any real mass penetration of the Communist doctrine. Out of approximately 150 million inhabitants barely five to eight million are industrial workers, and many of these must be classed as small artisans. The development of "class consciousness" is hampered by the variety of ethnic and racial stocks among Latin American peoples and by the widespread lack of education among the working class. Finally, Communist agitation against "imperialist exploitation" suffers from the recognized fact that Latin America needs foreign know-how and capital to bring about economic development.

Other articles in the special section of *Estudios Sobre el Comunismo* deal with recent developments in individual countries. Unfortunately, all of them suffer

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from an excess of polemics, detracting somewhat from the undoubted usefulness of the materials offered. One worth mentioning, however, is "The History of Another Treachery," by Pedro V. Domingo, an analysis of one of the most interesting recent episodes in Latin American political history—the regime of Dr. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party in British Guiana. The author believes that Jagan and his leftwing supporters were cynically abandoned by the international Communist leadership after their election victory in April 1953. At the time the Cominform dispatched two of its top agents, Candelaria Prades, and Gayetano Huesca to the country in order to assess the situation. After a period of hesitation concerning the degree of aid to be extended to Jagan, it was apparently decided not to make any real efforts on his behalf. Communism, it was felt, could not gain enough support to sustain itself in British Guiana; moreover, Cominform aid to Jagan would strengthen pan-American and Anglo-American cooperation, jeopardizing more important Communist objectives on the Continent. Consequently, the sum total of international Communist support for Dr. Jagan's regime was a token allocation from the "solidarity fund" of the WFTU, voted at the instance of Gutierrez, Latin American Cominform leader, at the third WFTU Congress in Vienna.

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

Russia and the Near and Middle East, by Wayne S. Vucinich, *Current History*, Philadelphia, (Pennsylvania), February 1955.

No one who has witnessed the political struggles of this first post-World War II decade can have the slightest doubt concerning Soviet interests and aspirations in the less developed countries of the Near and Middle East. The author of this article, however, takes us back into the history of the Russian Empire in order to show that present Soviet policies are deeply rooted in the traditional expansionist orientation of Russian imperialism. The rulers of the Kievan Rus in the year 860 launched an attack upon Constantinople, and by the 10th century they were maintaining lively trade relations with Byzantium. Other landmarks in Russian expansionism southward were Ivan the Terrible's conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan (1552, 1556); Peter the Great's occupation of Azov (1696) and dismemberment of Persia (1726); Catherine the Great's defeat of Turkey accompanied by the conquest of the Crimea (1783) and Russia's entry into the Mediterranean; the Russian wars with Persia and Turkey during the first half of the 19th century, culminating in the Crimean War (1853–56); the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 establishing Russian mastery over the Balkans; and finally World War I, leading to the destruction of Tsarist Russia and of the Ottoman Empire.

Control over the Turkish Straits and dominance in Persia and Afghanistan were the fixed goals of Tsarist policy, and formed the focal points of most of these conflicts. With the coming of the Communist regime, little change occurred in the goals of Soviet policy, but the tactics of internal subversion, infiltration and propaganda were added to the traditional tools of diplomacy and military pressure.

The Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East (1920) was designed to carry the torch of Communist revolutions to all the underdeveloped areas and especially to Soviet Russia's primary region of interest, the Near and Middle East. During the interwar period, however, the USSR was generally in a weakened state and thus was unable to advance her Near Eastern aspirations; with regard to the Straits, she had to be content with the Montreux Convention (1936), which gave Russia some privileges but left control firmly in the hands of Turkey.

World War II and its aftermath offered the Soviet Union new opportunities for expansion. By enabling the USSR to establish diplomatic missions and propaganda agencies throughout the Near and Middle East, by bringing Soviet occupation troops temporarily into Persia, and finally by the creation of a string of satellites in the Balkans, the Soviet Union has been able to advance considerably her traditional expansionist plans in this area. Only the simultaneous emergence of a strong democratic bloc can successfully check the march of Soviet imperialism.

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Muslims of Soviet Central Asia, Parts I & II, by Richard Pipes, *Middle East Journal*, Spring 1955, Summer 1955.

The fate of the Soviet Union's approximately 15 million Muslims has long been the subject of much guesswork and rumor among students of Soviet affairs. To their Muslim brethren in other parts of Asia and of the world the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union appeared either through the rose-colored spectacles of Communist propagandists or as the silent, impenetrable figure of the distant Sphinx.

Richard Pipes, author of these two articles, does not attempt to answer all the questions which could be asked concerning the Muslim population of the USSR, but he proceeds in a scholarly, dispassionate

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manner to examine some of the most important problems. His sources consisted of the available Soviet and non-Soviet literature on the area, supplemented by intensive interviews with Muslim refugees from the Soviet Union. The resulting picture affords some singularly lucid insights into the impact of the Soviet system upon Muslim society.

For one thing it is perfectly clear from Mr. Pipes' analysis that Islam as a religion cannot exist under Soviet conditions. Even when direct suppression and liquidation of the religious leadership ceased after 1932, the Islamic way of life continued to disintegrate in Soviet Central Asia. The new communist educated generation (including all the refugees interviewed by the author), raised in a rigidly materialistic environment in which religion is regarded as an obstacle to progress, almost universally rejects Islam. More importantly perhaps, the general impoverishment of the population coupled with a regime of strict work discipline, leaves little time for practicing the time-consuming rituals of Islam. Taking time off from work to recite the required daily prayers is regarded as "economic sabotage;" daytime fasting during the month of Ramadan is also forbidden, as is the festive slaughtering of sheep on "kurban bayram," the religious holiday concluding the Ramadan. The "hajj," the pilgrimage to Mecca, which is required of all Muslims at least once during their lifetime, is out of the question for all but a few handpicked, government-chosen individuals, and communal worship all but disappeared when Friday was decreed a regular working day back in the 1930's.

While Islam as a religion thus appears doomed in the Soviet Union, the same cannot be said of the ethnic and national heritage and individuality of the Soviet Muslims. Mr. Pipes' investigations disclose that, far from disappearing, the national consciousness of the peoples of Central Asia has probably been strengthened during the past few decades. Paradoxically, this development has taken place at least partly because of and in spite of official Soviet policy. For example, the drive against nomadic and tribal tendencies, necessitated by collectivization and state economic planning policies, has in effect served to spark and accelerate the process of nationalism; a similar reaction was produced by the large influx of Russian settlers into the region, the stress placed officially on the spread of the Russian language, and even by the reluctance to permit factual teaching of the history of the Central Asian peoples. In the latter case the author found an idealization of the national past, all out of proportion to the historical facts.

The violent Soviet opposition to any manifestations of pan-Islamism, or pan-Turanianism left in its wake a very considerable awakening of local national sentiment. Culturally, socially, linguistically, and to some extent even economically, the Muslim peoples of Soviet Central Asia have preserved their identity, and show every intention of maintaining it in the future. Intermarriage with Russians is frowned upon, and is almost nonexistent. Russians and Muslims may work together in state institutions and offices, but they do not mix socially, and the Muslim intelligentsia, though under pressure to use Russian, reverts to its native language whenever possible.

The author concludes that the Muslim peoples of Soviet Central Asia are today in the midst of a powerful nationalist revival, which is bound to present continuing political problems to the Soviet regime.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Russia, Southeast Asia and Point Four, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Current History*, February 1955.

At a time when the slogans and attitudes of the cold war are being hopefully shunted onto less travelled sidings, it may be useful to be reminded of the Soviet record in one of the great constructive non-political projects undertaken by the United Nations and by the United States—technical assistance. The author has examined Soviet actions in this sphere in the regions of Southeast Asia, and has found them for the most part singularly unconstructive and equivocal.

While assuming the role of "protector" of the interests of the less developed countries, the Soviet Union actually sought to sabotage any effective implementation of technical assistance programs. Whenever the advice of technical experts and mere economic logic dictated increasing agricultural productivity and developing light industries, Soviet spokesmen doggedly maintained that heavy industries offered the only way to successful economic development. Similarly, Soviet representatives in the United Nations would attack "exorbitant" prices charged in Western-sponsored development projects in the region, but in their own trade negotiations they would insist on top world prices for the products they wanted to sell. Most importantly, until the summer of 1953, the Soviet Union flatly refused to make any contribution to the UN technical assistance program, while keeping up a steady stream of propaganda against the Western-supported projects.

Since 1953 the Soviet Government has taken a somewhat different approach to the problem of economic assistance in Southeast Asia. It has offered to

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contribute to the UN technical assistance fund, and it has sought to expand bilateral economic relations with the countries of the region, particularly with India. At the same time it has initiated a considerable program of exchange of persons, with special emphasis on technical fields. The new Soviet policy, operating in an area where suspicions and distrust of the West are still rife, presents a formidable challenge to the democratic powers. They must realize, as must the nations of the area itself, that the long-range aims of the USSR are still to destroy the UN and US technical assistance programs, and thus to isolate the nations of the area from the democracies. In response to this new Soviet challenge the democratic powers must seek to intensify and expand UN technical assistance programs among the nations of Southeast Asia.

L. L.

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